University of Mississippi

eGrove
Honors Theses

Honors College (Sally McDonnell Barksdale
Honors College)

2008

Institutionalized Islam: A Study of the Union des organisations
islamiques de France
Andrus Gareth Ashoo

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis

Recommended Citation
Ashoo, Andrus Gareth, "Institutionalized Islam: A Study of the Union des organisations islamiques de
France" (2008). Honors Theses. 2290.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis/2290

This Undergraduate Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College (Sally McDonnell
Barksdale Honors College) at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized
administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

Institutionalized Islam

A Study of the Union des organisations
ISLAMIQUES DE FRANCE

Andrus Gareth Ashoo

Institutionalized Islam:
A Study of the Uniondes organisationsislamiquesde France

Andrus Gareth Ashoo

A thesis submitted to the faculty of The University of Mississippi in partial fulfillment of
the requirements of the Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College and
the Croft Institute for International Studies

Oxford
May 2008

Approved by

Lvisor: Dr.

Reader:

let Yukleyen

©2008
Andi'us Gareth Ashoo
All Rights Reserved

11

Acknowledgements
The idea for this thesis came during my semester in Amman,Jordan in 2005. As
the son of an Iraqi father, I went to Jordan to feel more a part of family reunions where
Arabic was ever-present. While in Jordan, I was surrounded by what seemed to be the
entire 2% of the country’s Christian population, starting with the family from whom I
was renting an apartment. While in Jordan, the various religious traditions were very
visible parts of my every day interactions with people from conversations with taxi
drivers to the call for prayer fives times a day,from the vocabulary learned in my
language classes to my Jordanian friends’ explanations of the problems in the Middle
East. The invitation by Father Nabil to attend the international conference to
commemorate the anniversary of the Amman Message, hosted by the Jordanian Interfaith
Coexistence Research Center, furthered my curiosity of the role of religion in Jordan and
the Middle East. While my father and his family lived in Iraq, they formed part of the
small Christian minority there. It was my personal search for identity that led me to ask
questions about the impact of the Muslim majority community on the Christian minority.
Due to my academic background in French language and culture, the project evolved into
a study of the Muslim minority in France. This paper reveals my findings about the role
of Islamic religious authority in France.
Concerning the body of work and the process by which it was completed, I would
first like to thank my advisor. Dr. Ahmet Yukleyen. I cannot express in words the respect
and love I have for this man. He served as a constant reminder that this thesis does not
rank among the things that are most important in life, forcing me to balance the thesis as
a part of my life rather than the focus of my life. Most importantly, though, I thank him
for being a friend first and an advisor second. His unwavering forgiveness of my failures
is something I wish to emulate with my students in the future. Special thanks also to my
other readers. Dr. Daniel E. O’Sullivan and Dr. Kees Gispen, for helping me to polish,
refine and remain dedicated. Thanks to the staff of the Sally McDonnell Barksdale
Honors College, the staff of the Croft Institute for International Studies, and all of my
professors for their support and encouragement. Thanks to my friends for keeping me
sane, especially to the many fraternity brothers who read parts of my thesis or attended
my defense. I would like to thank my family for being just that, a family in the truest
sense of the word. And above all else, I thank God for making this process something to
look back upon with thoughts ofjoy at the growth experienced in Him.

Ill

Abstract
Andrus Gareth Ashoo: Institutionalized Islam
A STUDY OF THE UNION DES ORGANISATIONS ISLAMIQUES DE FRANCE

(Under the direction of Dr. Ahmet YukJeyen)

This paper examines the role ofIslamic religious authority in France as it pertains to the
possibilities and limitations of Muslims becoming French. Such religious authority has
emerged in theform ofan institutionalized Islam promoted by both the Muslim
community and the French government. One ofthe majorfederations, the Union des
organisations islamiques de France(UOIF), was used as a case study. Primary data was
collectedfrom the websites ofthe UOIF and ofaffiliated organizations, pamphlets, and
newslettersfor the Rencontre annuelle des musulmans de France(RAMF). The nature of
the data collected centered on the UOIF's presented image, reactions to major issues,
affiliations and contributions to other organizations or movements. The study then uses
Frank Peter's idea ofthe ''Muslim field” in France to place the UOIF in the context of
the greater French society. This studyfound that the UOIFfunctions within the laws of
the French Republic while still contesting those laws that negatively affect the rights of
Muslims as French citizens. This role is influencing the potential reevaliiation ofFrench
Republican and laic values by the French government. Should no change occur in these
values, the UOIF would continue on its course to promote a French Islam.” However,
in the event that the values change, the role ofthe UOIF would have an increased
importance in the process of redefining
those values.
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Institutionalized Islam: An Introduction
France is home to Europe’s largest Muslim population with studies estimating the
total number between four and five million,^ making Islam the second largest religion in
France, next to Christianity. The large number of Muslims in France is a recent
phenomenon, which saw great growth in the 1960s and 70s with the influx of North
African immigrants coming to France to work, and the visibility of Islam in France has
grown as a result of major events

domestic and foreign—associated with Islam such as

rajfaire dufoulard [headscarf affair], riots in the banlieue of Paris, defamatory cartoons
of the prophet Muhammed in Denmark, and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
History and events like those provide the basis by which the West has developed its
conception of Islam as a “violent and changeless” religion.^
That perception of Islam as “changeless” has led to the question of Islam’s ability
to adapt to French society. There is one study that claims that half of the Muslims in
France in 2002 were French citizens.'^ However, France practices a form of secularism,
laicite, which separates expressions of religion from the public sphere entirely, and a
tradition which defines national identity not as a “biological, but a political fact:

one IS

French through the practice of a language, through the learning of a culture, through the

' No religious data is collected in censes and other surveys in France, so all of the numbers are estimates
using different methodologies, most taken from immigration statistics. See: Jocelyne Cesari. “Islam in
France: The Shaping of a Religious Minority.” Muslims in the West,from Sojourners to Citizens. (Oxford
University Press, 2002), 36; Jonathan Lawrence and Justin Vaisse. Integrating Islam: Political and
Religious Challenges in Contemporary France. (Brookings Institution Press, 2006), I;
^ Cesari 2002: 36.
^ Cesari 2002: 36.
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wish to participate in an economic and political life.”"^ The political ideology of Idicite
was first instituted during the Third Republic (1870-1940), which sought to tame the
cultural influence of the Catholic Church—and to marginalize and eradicate regional
languages

by initially introducing a French national curriculum that was both non

religious and entirely in French,^ In 1905, the French state officially declared that there
would be an official separation of church and state. The French government, ever since,
has been prohibited from recognizing or providing fiscal support to any religious
endeavors. Laicite affords important levels of protection by requiring neutrality of the
state in all relations to faith. In the Republican tradition, the crucial institution for
promoting the laic ideology is the educational system, which is how the government first
implemented the ideology. There was a shift in educational policy from “moral and
religious” instruction to “moral and civic” instruction-

such an education stressing the

idea of “good” citizens being those that are defenders of the Republic.^ Islam, represented
by those Muslims from the 1960s and 1970s, has not yet adapted to French Idicite as a
result of a rebellion to the French “assimilationist tendency” of integration into Idic
society.^
That relationship between Muslims and French society make it important to
understand the role of religious authority in France, especially with regard to the type of
Islam found in France. Religious authority can be founded on any individual, group or
institution that interprets religious sources. The Dutch anthropologist, Martin van

^ Dominique Schnapper. La France de I’integration. (Gallimard, 1991), 63.
^ Alec G. Hargreaves. “The Challenges of Multiculturalism; Regional and Religious Differences in France
Today.” Contemporary French Culture Studies. (Arnold, 2002),97.
^ Hargreaves 2002: 97.
^ Leveau, Remy and Shireen T. Hunter “Islam in France.” Islam. Europe's Second Religion: the New
Social, Cultural and Political Landscape. (Westport, 2002).
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Bruinessen, presented a paper on religious authority in Western Europe and posed the
question, “given the fact that Islamic knowledge is inherently contested, how do certain
^98

forms of Islamic knowledge become authoritative among Muslims in Western Europe?
In France, the religious authoritative figures play a different role than in their Muslimmajority countries of origin. The fact that Muslims form a minority community in France
requires religious authority not only as a leader to the Muslim population, but also as a
leader/or the Muslim population as a representative in French society. Religious
authority in France works both in the service of religious needs and in the safeguarding of
civic rights.^ That dual responsibility and the role of mediation within that context
emphasize the importance of religious authority in France, and it provides a point at
which to begin examining the question of whether Muslims can become French.
In France, such religious authority has emerged in the form of an institutionalized
Islam promoted by both the Muslim community and the French government. The Muslim
community has created French-recognized associations and larger federations of
associations. In addition to running mosques and religious schools, these bodies support
the Muslim community socially—tutoring for children, cultural gatherings, political and
civic awareness events

10

and politically—as a vocal representative to the French

government. With the many associations and federations in France come many issues
specific to the communities they represent, and the French state pushed for the creation of
an official” representation for the entirety of Islam in France

official” because such

participation in religious affairs marked a change in practice not recognized by the laic
ideology. From December of 2002 until April of 2003, Nicolas Sarkozy, then the
* Martin van Bruinessen. “Making and Unmaking Muslim Religious Authority in Western Europe.”(2003).
’Cesari 2002: 39.
10
Cesari 2002: 43.
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Minister of the Interior, helped establish an association called the Conseilfrangais dii
culte miisiihnan (CFCM)to fit the role of the defacto representative of Islana to the
French government and society. Sarkozy appointed the leadership of the council from the
three largest Islamic federations in France: the presidency from la Grande Mosquee de
Paris(GMP), which represents a large portion of the Algerian community, and two vice
presidencies from the Federation nationale des musulmans de France(FNMF), which
represents the Moroccan community, and the Union des organisations islamiques de
France (UOIF), which is a traditionally political Islamist umbrella organization of no
particular ethnic or national affiliation.
This study examines the interaction between Muslims and French society within
the context of institutionalized Islam with the goal of addressing the possibilities and
limitations of Muslims becoming French. An important topic within this study is the
developing idea of “French Islam,” which calls for Islam to adapt its beliefs and
traditions to French society. It is important to identify an Islamic representative body best
suited for a case study addressing the following question: Is institutionalized Islam a
contributor or an obstacle to the prospects of adapting Muslims’ practice of Islam to the
French laic society? The CFCM is relatively young and inexperienced and its original
role was to represent “the Muslim religion—and not Muslims themselves—in state
institutions.

I

This has limited its impact on the Muslim communities. It is therefore

more appropriate to focus on one of the major federations within the CFCM,as they have
each been involved in the context since at least 1985.
The Union des organisations islamiques de France(UOIF)is the most useful
federation for this case study. Created in 1983, it is one of the largest of the federations.
Lawrence and Vaisse 2006: 153.

4

controlling over 300 associations; unlike the other two federations, it is not associated
with any national or ethnic identity that might obfuscate the study; and it is has been
12

reported as the “most visible and effective” of the Islamic federations,

In addition, as

previously mentioned, the UOIF is traditionally associated with political Islamism—
which supports religion as affecting “all aspects of life: individual and collective, private
and public, from spiritual piety to politics” and would consequently conflict with
Iaidre-

but its efficiency in serving in the role between the French government and the
13

Muslim community might be evidence that even political Islam can adapt.
To address that apparent transformation and the role of the UOIF in
institutionalized Islam as an actor in the adaptation of Muslims’ practice of Islam to the
French laic society, it is first necessary to fully understand the role of institutionalized
Islam in France and from where the need arose for that institutionalization, which has
allowed the UOIF a claim to religious authority on a national scale. Second, its origins,
institutional history, leadership structure, principal activities and networks in which it
functions are also important. Those aspects will help to construct the identity of the
UOIF, to define the religious authority that it possesses to spread its vision of Islam, and
to track any changes in ideology. Comparisons between the way the UOIF presents itself
and how other institutions, scholars and intellectuals present the UOIF are necessary to
show how the work of the UOIF affects French society. This case study will provide an
analysis of the reactions of the UOIF and other actors to major issues such as I affaire du

12

See: Franck Fr^gosi. “La representation institutionnelle de I’islam en France. (2006); Fiammetta
Venner. L'OPA sur I’islam de France:Les ambitions de I’UOIF(2005; and Jocelyn Cesari. “Islam in
France : The Shaping of a Religious Minority.”(2002).
J0rgen S. Nielsen. Towards a European Islam. (St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1999), 73.
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foulard, islamophobia, and attacks on the federation itself, which will confirm or refute
the transformation in ideology of the UOEF.
14

Finally, the study shifts to the rest of the “Muslim field’

in France, which will

incorporate the actions of the other actors involved (i.e. the French government, the
French public, other Muslim representative bodies). This part of the study is important as
it provides a better understanding of the effect that the UOIF is having within the field.
The study shows that the UOIF follows the laws of the French state, that the UOIF still
contests the legitimacy of laicite, which restricts the practice of Islam, and that the
greatest limiting factor to the progress of the UOIF and institutionalized Islam is
islamophobia. However, the UOIF,coupled with the French government’s participation
in Islam, is a contributing factor in the emerging discussion on a possible reevaluation of
laicite, an ideology over 100 years old and entrenched in over two centuries of strict
Republican values.

Frank Peter. “Leading the Community of the Middle Way: A Study of the Muslim Field in France. The
Muslim World. 96(2006): 707-736.
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The Birth of Institutionalized Islam:
The Conseilfrancais du culte mvsulman(CFCM)
The idea of “Islam in France” as a single identity is misleading in that there is not
now and nor has there ever been one Islam in France. The Muslims of France have come
from many different countries with different ethnicities, as there are now second- and
third-generation Muslims, and the religious backgrounds from which they come are
defined by different schools ofjurisprudence. The many combinations of those factors
together have formed many different Islamic identities. The best example with which to
illustrate this point is the idea of institutionalized Islam in France. There are hundreds of
different associations, organizations and federations serving different communities all
over France, and they range in size and influence from the local prayer rooms in western
rural France to the Paris-based umbrella organizations representing the Islam at a national
level.
This chapter will show the impact of the many different organizations of varying
purpose and influence on the development of institutionalized Islam in France. It will
demonstrate how the French state, under multiple presidential terms, through many
different avenues and with a multitude of failures sought out to find, or create, a centrally
organized voice for the Muslim faith. In April of 2003, the elections of the Conseil
fran^'ais du culte musulman(CFCM)marked the creation of a representative body for the
Muslim community in France. However, the CFCM,like any newly created

7

representative body, has not gone without its growing pains. Divisions remain within the
body and they change based on the issue of discussion, which show that the CFCM has
yet to fulfill its role as the voice of Islam in France. It is important to look into the history
of its creation, the structure of the many actors of the CFCM,and the prospects for the
future. The study will then shift, in the following chapter, to the study of one of the major
actors within the CFCM.

History of Institutionalized Islam
The 1980s marked the emergence of institutionalized Islam in France.
Decolonization and the independence of former colonies in the late 1960s brought about
a sense of permanence for Muslim communities—permanence as opposed to the
temporality of the communities, which both the Muslims and the French state had
originally anticipated.^ On 3 July 1974, immigration into the country was suspended
under the government of Valery Giscard d’Estaing, and the permanence of the Muslim
community in France was solidified with the policy of regroupementfamilial(family
reunification) on 29 April 1976, which allowed families of those already in France to
immigrate and join together. This community wanted to practice their religion and
eventually came together in small groups for prayer, in some cases gathering in rooms for
prayer in their HLM and at their factories.^ Imams started to surface and lead prayers,
eventually becoming interlocutors between the Muslim community and elected officials.

‘ Cesari 2002: 37.
^ HLM is an acronym for habitation a layer modere, which is a type of government-subsidized housing that
is very commonly found in the outskirts of most major cities in France.
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I

The Muslim immigrants, having been brought to France to work, made an argument for
the state to take responsibility in helping them freely practice their religion.^
The conditions of meeting in small bedrooms and other rooms when possible
were not acceptable for their prayer time, as they were not always available for use and
space was not sufficient. Strikes arose in residences from 1973-76 as the residents
demanded prayer rooms, which eventually led to a “mosque policy” managed by
neighborhood associations."^ The Eglise de France^ even made the decision to help
provide facilities for Muslims to pray, allowing for the opening of prayer rooms in
churches in large cities all over France (Paris, Marseille, Lyon, Bordeaux,
Toulouse...etc).^ However the prayer rooms became an arena for debate and discussion
of the practice of the religion, which led to a discussion of the role of the mosque.
The mosque is not just a place for prayer. It also serves as a place for the
education of youth, theological teaching, libraries, fellowship, etc. The prayer rooms
were not able to fulfill the purpose of mosques, which the Muslim population needed.
There were even issues such as the observance of Aid al-Adha^-

when, in the early
998

1980s, “30,000 lambs were slaughtered each year in the Paris region alone,

The

inability for the French government to aid the Muslim community, due to the law of 1905
that separated church and state, forced the community to depend on money raised within
the community or from the support of Muslims in foreign countries.

^ Claude Perrotin. Qu'est-ce que VVOIF ? (Editions de rArchipel, 2006), 27-30.
Perrotin 2006: 30.
^ Eglise de France is a term used to denote the conglomeration of catholic churches in France.
Perrotin 2006: 30.
’Aid al’Adha is the one of two annual religious celebrations during the Islamic calendar. This celebration is
held after the hajj to Mecca and is to commemorate Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son when
commanded to by God.
* Lawrence and Vaisse 2006: 143.

9

Foreign governments supporting Muslims in France posed many problems for the
French state. The greatest revolved around the diminishing potential for the more
permanent Muslim community to be a part of the French society—^to the extent that
French society and values would seem less beneficial and therefore less important to the
Muslim community that was living in France. With the election of Fran9ois Mitterrand’s
socialist government in 1981 came the realization by the government that further ignoring
-

9

Muslim integration would undoubtedly cause a radicalization of the community.
Mitterand’s government abrogated those articles in the law of 1 July 1901, which
10

originally forbade non-French citizens to establish associations within France, In the
following few years, numerous Muslim associations were founded, and Islam took on a
much higher visibility in France—albeit divided by both identity and specific ideology as
11

will be shown in the following section.

Divisions Among Muslims
Franck Fregosi, an expert on the institutionalization of Islam in France, has
divided the Muslims of France into categories that allow us to better visualize the
differences among those communities.^^ He has made what seem to be two types of
divisions: divisions by identity and divisions by ideology. His divisions by identity are by
ethnic background and by generation. The divisions by ideology are by religious belief,
by socio-political outlook and by cultural identity. Other scientists might argue that there

^ Lawrence and Vaisse 2006: 143.
10

In the past, the French had to obtain royal authorization to create associations. The law of 1 July 1901
(now) allows anyone to create a non-profit association within the parameters set forth by the law.
"Perrotin 2006: 31.
Franck Fregosi. “La representation institutionnelle de I’islam en France.” Histoire de I'islam et des
musulmans en France du Moyen Age a nosjours. (Editions Albin Michel, 2006).
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are other ways of categorizing the divisions within Islam in France, but Fregosi’s model
is sufficient for the purpose of our study, which will show that the divisions do exist and
how some of the divisions form, providing, in turn, understanding as to why the
institutionalization of Islam emerged the way it did.
There are two major divisions of identity. First, Muslims in France can be geoethnically grouped together throughout France. In the Ile-de-France, the region
containing Paris and its surrounding area, the majority of the Muslim population is of
North African descent. However, in Alsace, the Turkish ethnicity is predominant and
followed by the North African Muslim community. Further still, the region of Bouchesde-Rhone, of which Marseille is the capital, is dominated by Algerians and communities
of the rest of Africa. Thus, linguistic, ethno-national and cultural differences have divided
the Muslims of France into different prayer groups, which come together because of a
shared identity outside of the religious belief. Ethnicity and culture are at the foundation
13

of why there is such varied Islamic representation.
Second, Muslim communities can also be divided by generation. Islam is still
th

very young in France due to the major influx of Muslim immigrants in the mid-20
century, which correlates to most Muslims being no more than second- and thirdgeneration French residents. This creates a generational difference in the practice of
Islam in France as the first-generation immigrants brought the same customs and
practices common with which they were raised in their home countries. Conversely, most
of their children and grandchildren were bom in France and have been raised just as
much in the French community at school and other public locations as they have in their

13

Fregosi 2006: 839.

II

own Muslim households. That generational difference has led to the next-generation
14

Muslims becoming “consumers” of religion, who choose which rules to follow.
In addition to those two divisions of identity, Fregosi presents three divisions of
ideology. First, there are many different movements concerning religious belief of which
15

Fregosi describes four.

The first is an internal, individualized practice of Islam that

focuses on the reflection of the spirit and emotions. The second is a pious practice of
Islam that is also more individualized, but it focuses more on the conversion of new
followers and a strict ritual practice. The third is orthodox Islam focused on the return to
the scriptures of the Quran and the beliefs in the four traditional schools of thought. The
fourth is the newest movement, reformed Islam, which is the least organized of the four
and which focuses on the importance of engagement within the environment where the
faith is practiced. Within each of the four greater movements are smaller movements that
16

are more particular and a large number of them have created their own associations.
Second, there are the socio-political divisions, which have created some of the
most active of Muslim associations in France. These divisions place importance in a
social and/or political agenda deeply rooted in Islam. There are those associations in the
interest of immigration laws for immigrants from certain countries of origin, such as Milli
17

Goriis, which “aspires to represent the religious interests of Turkish [immigrants].
There are others, usually youth movements like the Union desjeunes musulmans
18

(UJM), that act on behalf of an Islam based on the role of the active citizen; they are
less likely to entertain ideas of individualizing Islam and more likely to support a fight
14

Cesari 2002: 41.

Fregosi 2006: 841.
Fregosi 2006: 841-843.
17
Fregosi 2006: 844.
18
Fregosi 2006: 844.

16
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for social respect and justice for Islam and its practices. Still there are others, though few,
that represent a more radical approach, such as the Kaplanci, whose leader was
19

imprisoned in Germany after an attempted assassination.
Third, there is the division of cultural identity, which is similar to the geo-ethnic
divisions discussed earlier, but different in that it goes beyond the individual ethnic,
linguistic and political identity of a Muslim. This division represents Muslims who are
divided based on their allegiance to the best interest of a foreign country or group of
people. Many such organizations, such as the Turkish Diyanet and the Moroccan
Federation nationale des musulmans de France(FNMF),act in conjunction with the
foreign governments. The key to understanding this group of divisions is that the
emphasis is placed on the promotion of a cultural or national group, not the religion of
20

Islam itself."

The divisions among the Muslims of France are a reality and so is the complexity
of those divisions. Fregosi has simplified the divisions in a manner that is easy to follow,
but it is important to note that within those divisions there are further divisions and
crossovers. To illustrate that point, it is possible to have three Turks who attend the same
mosque, each of a different age from youth to elderly and each of which support a
different socio-political agenda. That means that each of those Turkish Muslims might
also adhere to a different Islamic organization in France. The vast number of Islamic
21

organizations in France is apparent when considering the divisions among Muslims.
The French government’s work toward the Muslim community becoming part of French

Fregosi 2006: 844.
Fregosi 2006: 845.
No reliable number can be cited because all religious groups in France are founded under many different
categories outside of the realm of religion (e.g. culture, ethnicity).
20

13

society became more complicated with the understanding that there were many Muslim
communities.

Initial Attempts Toward A Single Representative Muslim Body
As it is impractical to try to understand the needs and desires of the each Islamic
organization, the French authorities since the early 1990s have devoted their efforts to the
“creation of a body to represent the Muslim faith to engage in dialogue with the French
state and local government authorities on issues linked to Muslim religious
observance.

Additionally, this project was thought of as a way for the French

government to reduce foreign influences on the Muslim population by engaging the
23

community in a discourse with the French—an attempt to create an Islam for France.
The project was also thought of as integration policy in that by engaging the Muslim
24

community, the French government was also engaging a large immigrant community.
The first attempt at representation for the Muslim faith occurred between 1990
and 1994 with the creation of the Conseil de reflexion surVIslam en France (CORIF).
Pierre Joxe, the Minister of the Interior, was the man behind the creation of CORIF, a
group of 15 selected members charged with an advisory position to the ministry. The
specific goals of this group were to offer advice to the minister with regard to aspects of
religious practice (e.g. prayer times, calendars for Ramadan, ritual) and to consider
possibilities for a better representative institution for Islam in France. Unfortunately,

22
23

“The Muslim Faith in France.” La France a la loupe.(French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007), 2.
Lawrence and Vaisse 2006: 138.

24

Lawrence and Vaisse 2006: 142. It is important to note than in the study of Muslims in France, the term
‘integration’ is highly debated. Where as the original meaning referred to a combination of values from
both parties, the French government’s idea of the term refers more to the minority population’s assimilation
into French society—even at the expense of the values of the minority population.

14

CORIF’s support of the ministry was no more beneficial than the divided opinions of the
25

many organizations it was attempting to represent.
The next Minister of the Interior, Charles Pasqua, attempted to define the relations
between the French government and the followers of Islam in France with the Charte du
cidte nnisulmcin en France (Charter of the Muslim Cult in France), signed on 10 January
1995. The document served as a sort of contract for Islam outside of the Islamic world
(i.e. Muslim majority countries). The charter foreshadowed the eventual creation of a
representative body for the Muslims of France that would serve as an interlocutor to the
French authorities. The charter also presented the desire of Muslims to practice Islam and
the desire of the French state that the Islam practiced be in harmony with the values of
the French Republic.

However, though the charter proposed ideas on which many

Muslims agreed, the control of the Muslim voice posed a problem because Pasqua was
associated with Dalil Boubakeur, rector of the Grande Mosquee de Paris(GMP), with
whom he negotiated the charter, along with a certain number of other organizations close
to the GMP. Problems arose because the Muslims of France were skeptical of an
organization that would work so closely with the government and, more importantly, that
the GMP did not represent the interests of Muslims not affiliated with the federation,
especially those who were not Algerian. Boubakeur is credited with co-authoring the
published version of the charter. The distrust in the GMP left the charter without
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which is easy to see in the language and purpose of the charter.
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substantial support on the Muslim side.^^ Such a lack of support left the French Ministry
28

of the Interior to start anew with the project.

The Groundwork for the Conseilfrangais du culte musulman(CFCM)
Eventually the arrival of Jean-Pierre Chevenement to the Ministry of the Interior
in 1997 changed the angle with which the French government would try to pursue the
creation of a representative body for the Muslim community in France. From the
beginning of his tenure, he made it a point to understand fully the situation and the
problems associated with past failures. The first of those problems was that of having a
privileged Islamic organization helping the ministry; only a more official and wide-range
representation of advisors would bring a more official and fully representative Muslim
voice. With that idea and many exchanges between the ministries of the Interior and
National Education, the French government created the Ecole des haiites etudes en
sciences sociales(EHESS)in May of 1999. From that school, the Ecole nationale
d'etudes sur I'Islam et sur les societes du monde musulman(ENEISMM)was created to
form a public structure for the teaching and research of all matters concerning Islam. It is
now called the Institut d'etudes de Vislam et des societes du monde musulman
29

(IISMM).

Chevenement did not stop with the research and educational facets of the
problems. In November of 1999, after having extended the invitation to Islam to “take its
seat at the table of the Republic,” he launched an official consultation with the Muslims

27
28

Fregosi 2006: 848.
Glen Feder. “The Muslim Brotherhood in France.” In the National Interest.(2005).

29

Fregosi 2006: 849.

16

of France.

Present at the consultation were five principal Muslim organizations of

France, a number of key Muslim figures, and six great mosques and regional Islamic
31

centers.

The participants were selected in order to have a Muslim orientation current

with the diverse ideological differences and the many ethnic populations represented by
the Muslims of France. Chevenement saw exclusion as a great problem in previous
attempts at bringing Muslims together.
The consultation had two primary objectives: actively participate as
representatives of Islam at the legislative level and construct, among the existing
organizations, a central belief and decision-making authority—the first step of which
32

would be the creation of representative organization for all Muslims of France,

The first

two series of meetings were used to agree upon and refine the goals of the consultation.
The third series of meetings concluded on 3 July 2001 with the signing of an agreement
concerning the details of the elections for what would become the Conseilfrangais du
culte musulman (CFCM). The CFCM did not see the day under Chevenement, but the
success that he experienced while in office was the first of its kind and the possibilities
for a unified and supported voice of Islam in France were on the horizon.

30
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figures were Saada Mamdou Ba,an anthropologist at CNRA; Soheib Bencheikh, the mufti of Marseille;
Michel Chodkiewicz, a university student; Sheik Khaled Bentounes, a leader of the ‘Alawiyya
Brotherhood; Mohsen Ismail, a theologian; and Betoule Fekkar, president of Terres d'Europe. The six great
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Saint Denis de la Reunion.
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The CFCM Becomes Official
The man most often associated with the creation of the CFCM is Nicolas Sarkozy,
Minister of the Interior in 2002 and new President of France. He echoed his predecessor.
Chevenement, in an interview saying,“we cannot ask Muslims in France to respect the
values of the Republic if we do not invite them to the table of the Republic. I am of the
»,33

conviction that a humiliated identity is a radicalized identity,

He was much more

public in his approach, choosing even to speak at the Rencontre annuelle des musulmans
de France in 2003. Before Sarkozy arrived, the progress under Chevenement was slow
34

because of a struggle for control by the five consulted federations.
Sarkozy took over the project from his predecessor and started by making a
fundamental change to the method of selection of representatives for the CFCM; he
pushed for the nomination of the central body of the CFCM for a term of two years, even
before the first elections took place. In addition to the advice he received from the official
consultation organized by Chevenement, he sought the opinions of the ambassadors of
Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. He appointed the Grande Mosquee de Paris(GMP),the
Union des organisations islamiques de France(UOIF)and the Federation nationale des
musulmans de France(FNMF)to the presidency and two vice-presidencies, respectively.
The selection of those federations correlates to the large communities that they represent.
The GMP and the FNMF both enjoy foreign support from Algeria and Morocco,
35

respectively, while the UOIF represents the religious conservatism of Islam in France.
Their appointment was made official with the approval of the rest of the members of the
consultation on 20 December 2002.
33
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After successful elections in April 2003, the Conseilfrangais du culte musulman
(CFCM)became official on 3 May 2003.^^ The turnout for the elections was high—
88.5% of delegates voted—despite various cries for a boycott, mostly by youth
37

movements skeptical of what the CFCM was going to accomplish.

From the elections.

the French government was very pleased to confirm the decision made to appoint the
three executive bodies because no organization was given an absolute majority. The
French government considered the electoral support of the CFCM as a positive
advancement toward the Muslim community becoming a part of French society.

The Role and Structure of the CFCM
The Conseilfrangais du culte musulman(CFCM),officially an “association” of
the non-religious type outlined in the law of 1901,“represents the Muslim faith
community; its role is to settle questions arising from religious observance, but it has no
spiritual authority insofar as it is not a theological body issuing opinions on religious
matters. Its missions are: to defend the dignity and the interests of the Muslim faith in
France; to foster and to organize the sharing of information and services between places
of religious worship; to encourage dialogue between faith communities; and to provide
,,38

representation for places of Muslim worship in dealings with the official authorities.
The CFCM consists of an executive committee, a board of management, and a
general assembly. The executive committee is chaired by the rector of the GMP, with two
deputy chairs coming from the UOIF and the FNMF.The main task of the executive
committee is to administer the board of management, which consists of 65 members.
36
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two-thirds of which are elected. According to the French Ministry of the Interior, the
elected members from 2005 are represented by the FNMF(19 seats-10 regions), the
UOIF(10 seats-7 regions), the GMP(10 seats-1 region), the Comite de coordination des
39

miisidmans turcs en France(CCMTF, 1 seat- 4 regions) and independents(3 seats).
The regions of France are represented by the Conseil Regionaux du Culte Musulman
(CRCM), the local actors of the CFCM.The unelected members are representatives of
the federations, great mosques and leading Muslim figures that were all participants in
the official consultation launched by Jean-Pierre Chevenement. Finally, the general
40

assembly consists of 194 individuals.

The three position-holding federations have held almost two-thirds of the seats in
the board of management since the initial elections in 2003. The GMP,funded by the
Algerian state and largely supported by Muslims of Algerian descent, has experienced a
decrease in its representation on the board. However, the other two federations both
experienced an increase in representation in the elections of 2005. The FNMF has
experienced the largest growth, which can be explained by its establishment as the
historically staunch opposition of the GMP and the Algerian “hegemony” over Islam in
41

France.

The influence of the GMP and Algeria over Islam in France has been on the

decline as the French government has forced a shift in leadership of Islam by devaluing
national ties and promoting organizations that promote French society. Coincidentally,
the FNMF is primarily a Moroccan-supported federation, and as such, it has boosted the
influence of Moroccan Muslims in France. The UOEF has avoided the controversy over
ties with foreign governments entirely, and its success in the elections is due to its
39
40
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presence in all sectors of society and regions of the country, which promotes a brand of
42

Islam in which French society desires to engage.
The problem is that though the turnout for the elections was very good and
represented a step toward a representation for Islam in France and accountability of the
representative organizations, the differences in the interpretation of the Quran and in
opinion over an Islam supportive of the ideals of the French Republic still separate the
three representative federations of the executive committee. In addition, the alliances that
form depending on the issue at hand and the ambitions of each individual federation have
impeded the progress of the CFCM. Most important among the ambitions of the
federations is that of representing a majority of Muslims in France.
The lack of support for the CFCM by the French Muslim community makes the
council difficult to examine as a leader in institutionalized Islam. However, the three
major federations in France have experienced all of the major events of the past two
decades and hold legitimacy with the Muslim population and, thanks to the CFCM, with
the French government. One in particular stands at the forefront. In addition to the rise in
electoral results already shown in this chapter, the media coverage and overall activity of
the federation, the Union des organisations islamiques de France(UOIF)is the most
powerful of the three federations."^^ The following chapter provides an understanding of
the role of the UOBF within the CFCM and as it relates to the role of institutionalized
Islam in France.
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The UOIF: History and Structure
The Union des organisations islamiques de France(UOIF) was created 3 August
1983 as a federation, which now includes over more than 300 Muslim organizations
around France. Holding one of the vice-presidential seats in the Conseilfrangais du culte
musidman (CFCM),the UOIF is active at the national level. The UOIF is a constant
presence in the media due to its discourse and national activities such as the annual
national gathering it hosts in Paris each spring. Fregosi agrees with Xavier Temisien,
journalist covering religion for Le Monde,in his assessment that “the UOIF is the most
1

accomplished and effective national expression of Islam in France.
As active and influential as the UOIF has been, it has also remained an enigma
among the Muslim federations of France as it had never presented itself with all of its
structure and initiatives to the public until 2006. Claude Perrotin wrote Qu'est-ce que
ruOlF?, a book that reveals the history, purpose, activities, projects and responses to
issues within French society of the UOIF, and more importantly, as presented by the
leaders of the UOIF themselves.^ This is the first and only book written with the
collaboration of and by members of the UOIF to the public, and it is the only book about
the UOIF that is supported by the federation itself.^
Many other articles, interviews and books have been published about certain
facets of the UOIF and its actions. In 2005, Fiammetta Venner, a researcher for the
' Fregosi 2006: 842.
^ Perrotin 2006: 7.
^ The book is heavily publicized on the UOIF’s website.
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Centre National de Recherche Scientifique(CNRS),set out to present a precise study on
the entirety of the UOIF, in hopes that it would facilitate a better understanding of the
progress and future of the CFCM. Venner agrees with Fregosi at least on the importance
of the UOIF, commenting that “the UOIF represents the primary force of the CFCM,
and then asking,“what will be the future of the CFCM on the day when [the UOEF
increases its electoral results] and demands, logically and legitimately, the presidency
,4

[from the Grande Mosqiiee de Paris(GMP)]?’
As the primary force of the CFCM and thus, institutionalized Islam in France, the
UOIF is the subject of our study. It is important to look back at its origins, the
institutional history, and the leadership structure of the UOIF. In the next chapter, it will
be beneficial to comment on the institutions that support and are supported by the UOIF,
and present a study of the actions and discourse of the UOIF to improve understanding of
this representative body of Muslims in France. The challenge will be in whether there are
clear answers to all of those questions, providing a stronger understanding of the role of
the UOIF and the prospects for the future of institutionalized Islam in France.

Origins: Controversy from the Beginning
The UOEF was an initiative undertaken by two foreign students who had come to
France for their studies: Zuhair Mahmood, a Tunisian, and Abdallah Ben Mansour, an
Iraqi. They created the UOIF as the Union des organisations islamiques en France—the

Fiammetta Venner. L’OPA sur Tislam de France : Les ambitions de TUOIF rr'nimnnn-lp.vy. 2005), 8-9.
Unfortunately, Venner’s research is not as reliable and objective as she intended. She often makes illogical
connections between the UOIF and the Muslim Brotherhood, and with those connections, she then uses the
ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood to show the faults of the UOIF. Her book has not been totally
discounted as it is the most detailed reference with regard to the origins of the founders of the UOIF, but
other resources are cited in this study, which either confirm or reject her research.
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en would later be changed to de—on 3 August 1983. Those two facts alone seem to be the
only widely presented truths about the origins of the UOIF. Some resources^ will provide
more history on the reasons behind the creation of the federation, while others^ might
ignore the impact of the two students all together and jump to the initial organizational
members of the federation. Both parts are presented here.
The following is the account of the two students as presented by the Fiammetta
Venner’s work, L'OPA siirVislam de France: Les ambitions de VUOIF. Before creating
the UOIF, the two students were active in Muslim student associations in college. They
met through one particular association, VAssociation des etudiants islamiques de France
(AEIF). In the 60s and 70s, many Muslim students, like Mahmood and Mansour, had
come to France to study, eventually finding reason to continue their lives in France, but
many of the religious mentors of their countries of origin
the Sudan and Faisal Mawlawi of Lebanon

such as Hassan al-Tourabi of

■thought it unlawful to live in a non-Islamic

country. Mahmood and Mansour led a group of students from the AEIF who wished to
remain loyal to the Islam of their countries of origin even while residing in France.^ As a
result, they created a rival organization, the UOIF, which remained very similar in
structure to the AEEF.
The UOIF, while confirming the initial initiative by Mansour and Mahmood,
claims that the federation was created “when 12 leaders—of no particular ideology or
movement—of Muslim organizations decided to travel across France and create a
network through which to work nationally.”® The UOIF considers its creation as a point

^
^
^
*

See: Venner 2005.
See: Perrotin 2006.
Venner 2005: 11-13.
Perrotin 2006: 32.
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in the beginning of the Muslim community in France: many organizations with foreign
alliances existed at the time, but organizations like the UOIF were to be “the future of
addressing the immediate needs and concerns of the Muslims of France.
The controversy over the origins of the UOIF comes from the potential
association of the UOIF with the Muslim Brotherhood, which has been linked with
teiTorist organizations and extremism. The UOIF has also been linked with Said
Ramadan al-Boutih, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and exiled to France,
Faisal Mawlawi, former student of the AEIF and leader of a terrorist organization in
Lebanon and Rachid Ghanouchi, also a former student of the AEIF and leader of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia, all as playing mentorship roles for the UOIF during or
shortly after its creation.

However, Jocelyne Cesari, a leading researcher of Muslims in

the West, reports that though the Muslim Brotherhood is politically active in other
countries, in France, “their main concern is the preservation of Islam among new
11

generations who might otherwise be assimilated into western culture,

Personal links

and similarities in ideology are apparent between the UOIF and the Muslim Brotherhood,
but it can neither be confirmed nor denied that the two organizations actively cooperate,
The UOIF has evolved since its creation

even changing the name of the federation. The

study will look at the institutional history in the following section—and the next chapter
will look at the discourse and actions

●with the intent of better tracing the changes and

evolution of the UOIF since its creation over two decades ago.

^ Perrotin 2006: 32.
10
Venner 2005: 11-15.
Cesari 2002: 42.
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Institutional History
Lhaj Thami Breze, president of the UOIF, believes that the history of the UOIF is
marked by three distinct periods of growth. The first period was the creation of the
federation by foreign students with little regard for the country of France and whose
reflections came from the Muslim world. Eager to make a difference, the students,
“rapidly and in a natural fashion, published a prayer calendar for the largest cities in
France, organized accompanied pilgrimages to Mecca, oriented itself towards families,
started activities for women, organized vacation colonies for children and laid the
foundation for the large gathering, which later became la Rencontre annuelle des
miisiilmans de France(RAMF).

13

The second period followed quickly thereafter, and marked a change of
perspective and a clarification of purpose. In 1987, the charter of the UOIF no longer
considered the Muslims of France as foreigners who were going to live in France
temporarily but rather as French citizens. In 1990, this perspective became noted in the
name of the organization, changing the

France''[in France] to "'‘de France"[of

France].*'^ It became necessary to move toward an Islam that considers the French
context, that does not conflict with society and that does not follow any particular
Muslim school of jurisprudence, which would exclude different Muslim communities in
France. The initiative to not follow a certain school ofjurisprudence is a very radical idea
among Muslims in that the UOIF is creating its own school, and yet to the French state it

^ Perrotin 2006: 20.
Perrotin 2006: 33.
14
Perrotin 2006: 34.
13
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would not be considered as radical*^, as the purpose is to have Islam be a part of French
society. To become a group working for and within the context of the Muslims as French
also marked the first break from Muslim Brotherhood ideology.
Breze has repeated many times that “the doctrine of the Muslim Brotherhood is
certainly valid on Islamic land,[but he] is not thinking about trying to reproduce [in
I

France] their same objectives and methods without considering the difference of the
situation.” Tarek Oubrou, imam in Bordeaux and member of VAssociation des
musulmans de Gironde^ a member of the UOIF,states that “for young Muslims who
wanted to reflect and take action, the literature of the Muslim Brotherhood was the only
thing available,[but] the literature addresses a philosophy bom in the Muslim world^^, a
reality that does not correspond with a secular society where we live. We have thus
97

17

shaped our own reading of the relationship of Islam around society.
The third and final period is that of integrating** Islam into the institutional,
republicain and laic frame. This last phase started just before Breze came to office with
the 1990 invitation by the Minister of Interior, Pierre Joxe, to Abdallah Ben Mansour to
participate in the Conseil de reflexion surVislam de France(CORIF), an advisory
council to the ministry on religious affairs. Breze was elected to the presidency of the
UOIF on 12 May 1992. Breze believes that “at the community level,[Muslims] need to
free [themselves] from interpretations unfit for [their] reality; from traditions that are not

\5

The idea of radicalism with regard to the UOIF, the French state and the greater Islamic community will
be further addressed in the following chapters on the discourse and actions of the UOIF and the Muslim
field in France.
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When he says “Muslim world” in this context he is referring to the parts of the world where Islam is a
majority religion.
Perrotin 2006: 19.
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The term “integrating” and the idea of “integration” are used by the UOIF throughout its literature, but it
is important to remember that in the context of the UOIF, this refers to integration as a collaboration
between two parties—in this case, the Muslims and the French state—rather than an assimilation.
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at the heart of Islam and that can make the practice of Islam difficult [e.g. the banning of
the headscarf, which will be presented in the next chapter]; and finally, from foreign

j

allegiances. We need answers for how to best practice our faith. Outside of the
community, we must continue to call for more open-mindedness, to avoid close-minded
laicisme, to get past certain images and prejudices and to treat Muslims like citizens.
The problem: “we are in need of time, but rare are the times when people are so indulgent
as to leave us that time
99

And look how much ground we have already covered in a mere

19

15 years.
The UOIF’s main goal is to help Muslims in France “live and practice their
religion in the serenity, dignity and harmony of their environment.” The way they
achieve this goal is two-fold: they try to create an environment where Muslims can
practice with Muslims of all backgrounds, and they also try to stimulate a dialogue with

I

the rest of society in hopes of breaking negative stereotypes and building a better
20

community.
The way the leaders of the UOIF present the federation is not adequate to draw
conclusions about the federation, which is why the following chapter will take the
presentation of the UOIF and the larger discourse of the UOIF and compare it with the
actions and criticism of other scholars. Before that part of the study, the next section will
discuss the leadership structure of the UOIF to take into consideration how the decisions
i

and actions of the UOIF are executed.

1
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Leadership Structure
Scholars^' consider the UOIF as one the most effective of the Islamic federations
in France. Effectiveness is usually attributed to two things: planning and organization.
The brief history shows the planning and purpose of the UOIF, but the organization of the
leadership structure will show how the UOIF is able to address issues and accomplish the
goals it sets.
The President of the UOIF is Lhaj Thami Breze, a Moroccan educated in France,
who was sent to France by his father, Issa. He considers himself French—he has
citizenship—and his children are entirely French—Bordelais even, as they were upset to
move up to Paris when he became president. He has two daughters and three sons with
his Moroccan wife, whom he married in 1983 after his first hajj}^ He believes in God
46

who knows how to facilitate all things,” and he tries to help his students have such a
23

faith in God as well.

His quest in religious leadership started when he organized a group of Muslim
students for prayer at his university in Bordeaux. They met at a Catholic church, and he
eventually ascended to the position of imam, a position in which he would not serve
,24

again: “it is not [his] profession and [he] did not specialize his studies enough for that.’
He eventually became active at the administrative level of Muslim associations. He was
the representative of VAssociation des musulmans de la Gironde (Bordeaux) when the
UOIF was created in 1983.

21
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which every able Muslim is required to partake.
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He first became active with the UODF in 1988 when he was the delegate for the
Southwest region. He would jokingly explain that his job was “becoming president [of
the UOIF].” A student of political science, he did not see himself in politics because of
his love for all people; rather,“he became very passionate about public service,
»25

especially towards the Muslims of France, and set his goal to be president,

Breze has

served in many capacities throughout his lifetime and he continues to work with and
support those organizations with which he has worked even now: VAssociation des
mnsulmans de Gironde, Conseil regional des associations islamiques du Sud-Ouest de la
France (CRAISOF), Secours islamique, etc.
Elected president on 12 May 1992, Breze serves on the Bureau executif
(executive cabinet) of the S/ege national(National Headquarters) of the UOEF, which
brings together the many regional branches, which serve within the framework of the
CFCM’s Conseils regionaux du culte musulman(CRCM),and the administration
generale. There are about 12 salaried positions and interns, further aided by over 100
volunteers. The mandate is for four years. Elected from the 19-member administration
generale—which is elected from the general assembly of the UOIF—the president has
one month to propose his bureau executiffor approval.
The work of the UOEF is divided among the Secretariat national and ten
departments.^^ According to the UOIF, most of the departments are self-explanatory, but
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The other members are Fouad Alaoui, Secretary General of the UOIF and vice-president of the CFCM;
Mohamed Nazir Hakim, Treasurer and vice-president of CRCM-Rhone-Alpes; Okacha Ben Ahmed Daho,
Adjoint Secretary General and vice-president of CRCM-Limousin; Bachir Boukhzer- Director of
Communications; Boubaker el-Hadj Amor, Director of Education, president of lESH and president of
CRCM- Poitou-Charentes; Zuhair Mahmood- Director of Religious Affairs and director of the ChateauChinon branch of lESH; and Abdeneaceur Zerrouki, Director of National Activities.
27
avec
Departement des activites nationales [Department of National Activities]; Departement de relation
les associations [Department of Relations with the Associations]; Departement de Vinformation et de la
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they highlight two.“^ The Departement des affaires religieuses takes care of the religious
needs of the UOIF,relying above all on Dar al-Fatwa, an institute for reflection and
research on theology with regard to life in France. This department helps with, among
other things, integration into French society, the use of French in Friday sermons.
tracking the Muslim calendar and marriage. One of the major goals for this department
was interreligious dialogue; local and regional activities have helped make that facet a
29

success.

The Departement des activites nationals occupies itself with national events, most
importantly: la Rencontre annuelle des musulmans de France, vacation centers during the
summer for fellowship, study days, sponsored by universities to focus on Islam in France,
seminars for members and member institutions, national competitions for the
30

memorization of the Qur’an.

The last structural piece of the UOIF is the general assembly, which is composed
of over 300 member associations, in more than 150 important cities, at three levels of
membership: cooperative, ordinary and active.^* The associations propose their
membership to the UOEF general assembly, and the number of voices for each association
is determined by the quality of their work. The majority of the member associations serve
a religious purpose with almost two-thirds owning or directly running one or more

communication [Department of Information and Communication]; Departement de Venseignement
[Department of Instruction]; Departement des affaires culturelles [Department of Cultural Affairs];
Departement des affaires religieuses et Dar al-Fatwa [Department of Religious Affairs and Dar al-Fatwa]\
Departement de 1’education et de la formation des cadres [Department of the Training of Officers];
Departement dii dialogue interreligieux [Department of Interfaith Dialogue]; Departement des relations
publiques [Department of Public Relations]; Departement desfinances et du developpement des ressources
[Department of Finances and the Development of Resources].
28
Perrotin 2006: 55.
29
Perrotin 2006: 56-57.
.10
Perrotin 2006: 57.
31
Perrotin 2006: 52.

31

mosques. The UOIF is right now the direct owner of 35 mosques and religious centers for
32

the practice of the faith and meetings of the local associations,

Aside from that first

purpose of religious service, there are associations that serve more general purposes:
social, cultural, educational and humanitarian.
The UOIF and all of its member associations have agreed to a set of
administration principles that help them to achieve their goals. Those five principles are
participation, respect for decision-making bodies, decentralization and proximity, local
autonomy and federative action.
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Participation is a commitment to the creation of new

associations and the evaluation of current associations. The decision-making bodies
orient the actions of the UOEF through the consultation of the general assembly,
administration generate and a body that meets to verify the upholding of the UOIF’s
general policy and methodology for execution. Decentralization and proximity refer to
the CRCM and the promotion of visibility and relationship with the national Muslim
community at the local level.
Local autonomy refers to the autonomy afforded to the member associations with
regard to their administrative and financial workings, which must coincide with the
general policy of the UOIF. Their membership helps provide for the central budget of the
UOIF. The only call to the UOIF for funding by the member associations is for larger
34

projects like the construction of a new mosque, Finally, federative action refers to the
complementary national activities such as the Rencontre annuelle des musulmans de
France(RAMF),the organization of summer camps for youth, the impetus behind
private school projects and the development of training programs for teachers.
32
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Conclusion
The UOIF is an important representative of Muslims in France. The history of the
UOIF shows a true evolution through two key foundations. On the one hand, there is a
historical foundation, marked by an ideology brought from foreign Muslim countries.
which is highlighted by the changing of its name to represent the Muslims o/France
rather than Muslims in France. On the other hand, there is a structural foundation that has
grown drastically since the UOEF’s creation. That evolution shows that the UOIF has
become a representative of Muslims within the structure of French society. However, that
historical and structural growth does not give a full representation of the federation; it
provides merely the appearance of the UOIF. The activities, opinions and networks of the
UOIF will show what the UOIF is in practice, which can then be compared to the
appearance to create a more accurate representation of the UOEF. Those activities,
opinions and networks are presented in the following chapter.
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The UOIF; Activities,Opinions and Networks
The UOIF asserts that “the right of the Muslims of France to exist implies an
undoing of connections with the service of foreign Muslims, interpretations that are
inadaptable to the environment, and traditions that make religious practice difficult.”^
This statement is part of the religious discourse that the UOIF promotes about itself, but it
only encapsulates a very small portion of the desires of the UOIF. Olivier Roy, a
researcher for the Centre National de Recherche Scientifique(CNRS)and lecturer in
political and social science, believes that “the UOIF seeks to find a balance between an
avowed internationalist position and integration into the institutional French landscape
through participation in the CFCM.”^ Through the relationships with other initiatives, the
specific actions of the UOIF and its opinions of and reactions to certain events, it may be
possible to better understand the true intentions of the UOIF—whether it has truly
experienced an evolution in practice or just appearance. Furthermore, those relationships,
actions and opinions will start constructing the prospects for the future of the UOIF in the
way they develop the image of the UOIF as it relates to its Muslim followers, other
Muslims of France and the French state. That will provide the framework on which to
judge success and the UOEF’s role in the French Muslim field, which will be addressed in
the following chapter.

Perrotin 2006: 49.
^ Olivier Roy. Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah.(Columbia University Press, 2004),69.
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In this chapter, the study will attempt to visualize those relationships, actions and
opinions, addressing them by topic. The UOIF’s president, Lhaj Thami Breze, has
divided the principal activities of the federation into six categories: “management of the
religion, promotion and facilitation of worship, regional and national gatherings, defense
of the interests of Islam and Muslims in France, community-geared initiatives and
interfaith dialogue.”^ Using those six categories, this chapter will present the
organizations with which the UOEF works, the actions it takes to achieve its goals and the
discourse it presents with regard to major topics and events. Finally, we will look at any
remaining networks and resources that are not apparent in those six categories.

Management of the Religion
The management of the religion is the first of the principal activities of the UOIF.
The federation works toward this management by means of religious education, the
training of imams and the development oifatwasf Religious education is important to the
UOIF because it believes that youth are the most susceptible to the extremism—of
relating to an Islam that will exclude them from society—and to the laxity—of not
relating to the Islamic faith at all—that contradict one another. Education helps the youth
find an equilibrium; it is “crucial—second only to the transmission of Islam.” ^
Concerning religious education, the UOIF is more of a promoter of programs for its local
associations, and it stressed this topic at the Rencontre annuelle des musulmans de
France(RAMF)in 1995. The UOIF has a national seminar for Arabic language
pedagogy open to 150 directors of teaching at Islamic centers and mosques. In addition.
^ Perrotin 2006: 10.
■* The term fatwa refers to religious edicts released by Islamic scholars.
^ Le Journo I de la Rencontre Annuelle des Musulmans de France. March 2005.
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they have regional seminars that are more practical and personal, which are available to
50 teachers from the region.^
The topic of training imams has taken on more importance recently because of the
French government’s desire to see more imams trained in France. For the UOBF,there are
two types of imams, rateb and khateb, the former in charge of the five daily prayers and
the latter, the preacher, in charge of the Friday sermon and other ceremonies. In UOIF
mosques, the Friday prayers are in Arabic and French; the Quran is recited in Arabic and
the sermons are in French and Arabic. The imam is also in charge of religious education
of all ages, marriage ceremonies, a personal confidant for Muslims to go to in times of
need and finally, a representative to the non-Muslim community.^ Within the UOIF,each
association has a process for imam selection and funding in their mosques.
However, there is a problem in that there are not enough imams in France.
Bernard Godard, an advisor to the Ministry of the Interior, found that “approximately
1,000 to 1,200 imams are active in France, meaning that only three-quarters of prayer
spaces have a dedicated prayer leader...one in five imams is a French citizen (most
»»8

recently naturalized)...and only one-third of imams in France is fluent in French.
The ability for an imam to speak French and to understand French society and culture is
crucial to fulfill the role of confidant to the French Muslim community, and it is
sometimes a problem with imams trained in foreign countries. To address the need for
more imams trained in France, the UOIF created the Institut europeen des sciences
humaines(lESH), “an institution for religious formation for the European, and thus

Perrotin 2006: 77.
’Perrotin 2006: 100-104.
^ Lawrence and Vaisse 2006: 118.
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French, context.

This initiative was supported by the former Minister of the Interior,

Dominique de Villepin, who stated in 2005,“today out of 1,200 imams who practice in
our country, 75% are not French and one third don’t speak our language. This is
unacceptable. In France, we ought to have Imams who speak French.” He has been a
proponent of imams studying, in addition to their curriculum, subjects important to life in
10

French such as law, history and civics.
The lESH has two campuses in France, the first of which opened at Chateau
Chinon in 1992 and second of which opened in St. Denis, a Paris suburb, in 2001. It is the
only institute of its kind for the training of imams for leadership in France. The UOIF
claims that the lESH has three basic knowledge areas for the formation of their imams:
religious formation, social science, Arabic and French language. The ability to speak
French is highly stressed.^' However, one study claims that “the school has no academic
prerequisites for admission other than basic Arabic competence. Just three percent of the
Institute’s courses address Western civilization; the remainder focuses on Quranic
studies.

which is confirmed on the websites of both campuses.*^ Along with the

theological courses offered, there is an extensive offering of language courses, both in
Arabic and French. There is even an emphasis in Arabic language pedagogy—important
because the French do not grow up speaking Arabic, which is the language of the
Quran—so that imams are well equipped to serve in that capacity in their mosques, which

’A declaration made by Boubaker El Hadj Amor, president of the lESH, at the UOIF’s Rencontre annuelle
des musulmans de France in 1999.
10
Glen Feder. “The Muslim Brotherhood in France.” In the National Interest. (2005).
Perrotin 2006: 104.
Feder 2005.
Institut Eiiropeen des Sciences Humaines-Chdteau Chinon. <http://www.iesh.org>; and Institut Europeen
des Sciences Huniaines-Paris. <http://www.ieshdeparis.com>.
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1

makes the school one of the fundamental tools concerning the education of young French
14

Muslims.

Each year, 300 students are taken for two years of Arabic or four years of
theology courses; of the graduates of the institute, only about 180 serve as imams and
15

only about 20% of those serve in France. The position of imam is not very assuring
16

with the climate in France and the limited availability of funds for their payment.

In

addition, the arena in which imams serve today has advanced technologically to the point
17

where Muslims in an imam’s neighborhood can be in contact with an imam in Syria.
Even with the failures of the institution, the school remains the most important Islamic
18

seminary in France at present,

The director of lESH,Zuhair Mahmoud, does not think

that his school should be held accountable for the problems of French society. He thinks
that, “the Muslims have a lot to learn from Europe, if secularism means neutrality and not
refusal of religion...[Muslims] ought to spread the great values of humanity, such as
99

liberty, tolerance and dialogue.

19

The lESH has failed to fill the void of qualified imams in France, yet there are
still imams who are trained at lESH and who serve in France.^® The theology the BESH
promotes as part of the training of imams is the theology promoted by the UOIF, which is
a ‘French Islam.’ One of the most visible of the UOIF intellectuals is Tareq Oubrou, a
self-trained imam in Bordeaux, who believes that Islam can be compatible with French
law. He is interested in the adaptation of Islam within France, but also within the confines
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of Islam, and he has coined the term,""sharia de minoritej*^ which is not to be confused
with the practice offiqh al-aqalliyyat(jurisprudence of the minorities). According to
Ouhvon,fiqh al-aqalliyyat calls for “state recognition of Muslim personal law in Europe
based on grounds of religious pluralism,” which Oubrou finds to be a “ridiculous
expectation that shows ignorance on the side of some religious scholars.

Oubrou

believes that muftis'' should be socio-politically literate, having knowledge of the
23

Muslim reality and French and European laws.
For Tareq Oubrou and the UOBF,“the aim is not only to reconcile Islamic Law to
the secular context, but also—and quite explicitly—to counter the secularization of Islam
in Europe.

Though supportive of ijtihad—the effort of reflection, interpretation of texts

and adaptation to reality by the individual—and a proponent of living Islam, the UOIF is
concerned with an over-individualized practice of Islam, and it stresses the necessity for
the education of youth. At a talk given at one of the regional gatherings for the UOIF,
Oubrou argued the “necessary hierarchalization of believers and the indispensable
mediation in belief on the one hand while strongly insisting on the believer’s individual
„25

responsibility on the other.

The UOIF believes that a ‘French Islam’ is a way to save

Islam in France. The UOIF proposes a moderate reading of Islam that finds an
equilibrium far away from “literal extremism” and “extreme laxity.
In keeping a consistent reading of Islam, the UOIF founded its ov^nfatwa council,
Dar al-Fatwa. The members of the council are Ounis Guargah, professor at EESH-Paris;

21

Caeiro 2005: 48.
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A mufti is a religious scholar who interprets Islamic law.
Caeiro 2005: 48-49.
Caeiro 2005: 49.
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Frank Peter. “Leading the Community of the Middle Way: A Study of the Muslim Field in France. The
Muslim World. (2006), 724.
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Larbi Bechri, professor at EESH-Chateau-Chinon; TaharMehdi, professor at the
Academie de BriLxelles; and Tareq Oubrou.^^ It looks to promote a religious practice that
adapts to the context of living in France, not opposing the foundations of Idicite, and that
allows Muslims to freely practice their religion without unnecessary stress. However, the
UOIF will fight for an “open laicite" that is tolerant and respects the beliefs of all people,
something which the UOEF believes is not the current situation.^^ The major
responsibilities of Dar al-Fanva are to “take the view that is best adapted for the French
context among those available from the schools of thought (jurisprudence); take into
consideration the entirety of the European Muslim community; and help facilitate
28

religious practice.
The president, Ounis Guargah, expressed in an interview at the RAMF in 2007
that the fatwas, and thus the reading of Islam,from Dar al-Fatwa are based on the Quran
and sunna, the embodiment of the prophet Mohammed’s actions. Though often critiqued
for promoting an extremist Islam within France, there are some religious scholars from
the Middle East who have said that Dar al-Fatwa is promoting a “Light Islam,
they use to describe the council’s willingness to adapt to French society.

a term

Guargah

maintains that “it pulls from the richness of the Muslim theology and the different
30

99

schools ofjurisprudence to better facilitate the lives of Muslims in France.
Thefatwas of Dar al-Fatwa are not the only ones that the UOIF has had a history
of accepting and promoting. The UOIF translated the first collection oifatwas from the
European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR)from Arabic into French. The ECFR
26
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was founded in 1997 in London and is now headquartered in Dublin. The president is
Youssouf al-Qaradawi. This council intends to be thefatwa council representing the
entire European continent, which is an idea that is important for Islam in Europe, but the
ECFR is criticized for being “too fundamentalist,” and thus receives little respect from
the entirety of the Muslim population.^* It is a “leading, but by no means[an] uncontested
authority.

Recently in 2005, the UOIF “declined to translate and publish the ECFR’s

second collection offatxvas in French, as it had done with the first.”^^ A major reason to
explain the separation of the two organizations is difference of theology. The ECFR
promotesfiqh al-aqalliyyat (jurisprudence of the minorities), which is the theological
practice which the UOIF does not want to be mistaken for supporting. The UOIF
supports a reading of Islam—a “French Islam”—and sees to its dissemination through the
education of imams and studies presented in the form offatwas based off of its ^"sharia de
minorite" from its ovjx\fatwa council.

Promotion and Facilitation of Worship
The UOIF’s second principal activity is the promotion and facilitation of worship.
On a national scale, the UOIF has helped to do that by creating prayer calendars,
designing activities during the holy month of Ramadan, and promoting and providing
opportunities for the hajj to Mecca. A good example of this is the newsletter for the
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UOIF’s annual gathering. Each day’s newsletter has the times of the five prayers, and in
2007, it was full of advertisements from a travel agency with a discount for the hajj.^"^
A recent advancement in the UOIF’s work in this area was the creation of an
organization for the control and certification of halal^^ meat. The advertisements for this
organization were numerous at the latest national gathering hosted by the UOIF. Created
in March of 2007, HALAL SERVICE, under the direction of the UOIF,is headquartered
in Reims and plans to have offices in Paris very soon. Its first project, not one month after
its creation, was to certify all the restaurants and venders at the annual gathering. Such a
service in France helps the Muslim community in practicing the religion; in a Muslim
majority country, halal meat is readily available, but in France, it is services like HALAL
SERVICE that are helping to lay the infrastructure to assure that the meat Muslims are
buying is halal.
The most time-consuming and resource-consuming project in promoting worship
is the building and supporting of the construction of more places of worship. Mosque
building is one of the few ways in which the UOIF gets involved financially at the local
association level, usually through the development of fundraising efforts. The UOIF is
currently the direct owner of 35 mosques and cultural centers, and it has contributed to
37

the acquisition or construction of over 150 others.
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Regional and National Gatherings
The third principal activity is one at which the UODF excels more than any other
federation: the organization of regional and national gatherings for the Muslims of
France. “The purpose of the [these gatherings] is to regroup and fellowship with one
another, beyond our differences, so that we can debate and reflect on questions
m38

concerning Muslim life.

In the past year almost all of the twelve local CRCM hosted a

regional gathering with those goals in mind. The structure for those local gatherings came
from the larger national gathering, which the UOIF started in its very first year of
existence.
The gathering is called the Rencontre Anmelle des Musulmans de France
(RAMF),the 24th of which was held in 2007. This gathering, which takes place in Le
Bourget Exposition Center just north of Paris, has become the conference for the
39

Muslims of France and even Europe as Muslims representing all the cities of France
and parts of Western Europe attend. In 2007, the conference welcomed an estimated
150,000 people—10% more than in 2006.^° At the RAMF,there are presentations,
exposes, forums for discussion and workshops. There is the salon d'exposition, where
there are many stands selling cultural products. Then, there are the artistic evening
performances and social gatherings.
The gathering is very welcoming and all people are invited to attend. The UOIF
does use the gathering as a way of promoting its reading on Islam. In 2006, the director
of the conference, Mohammed Nazir Hakim,said, “[through these gatherings] we are

L Essentiel de la Rencontre Annuelle des Musulmans de France. April 2007.
Lhaj Thami Breze. “Declaration Finale de la Rencontre Annuelle des Musulmans de France. 16 April
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together building the Islam of France, a moderate Islam, a loving and tolerant Islam, a
moral and ethical Islam, a civic and shared Islam,far from all extremism and all laxity,
with men and women united in adversity, united in victory, who wish to live their
7^41

religion without discrimination.

However, the gathering has also hosted speakers from

faiths with which the UOIF does not agree. Father Michel Lelong is a frequent speaker at
the RAMF.“The vast number of participants and associations who attend the UOIF’s
three-day conference give the overall impression of having successfully integrated into
the French religious landscape.

The UOIF made available during the RAMF 2007 the

daily journals from the gatherings since the year 2005—they are on the website for the
gathering.

Each journal contains the daily prayer schedule, the schedule for the

conferences and a summary of the speeches of the previous day.
The general theme for the conference in recent years has revolved around Islam in
French society, trying to promote a way to understand Islam as it pertains to daily life in
France. For 2006, the theme was “Living one’s religion on a daily basis, God, his
prophets and man.’’ In 2007, it was “Muslims: in between pride, memory and identity on
one side, and islamophobia, discrimination and extremism on the other.” In 2007, the
conference fell one week before the first round of the French government’s presidential
elections. The topics covered at the conference provided for a means by which to educate
Muslims of their rights and responsibilities as a Muslim and as a French society. There
was a public debate space added in 2007 for more open debate. The themes throughout
the past three years have consistently related to the role of the Muslim in France, with the
major speeches stressing compatibility, a responsibility on the part of the Muslim
41
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community to actively participate in French society, and the responsibility of the UOIF to
continue to defend Islam in the face of a French state, whose values make the practicing
44

of the religion difficult.

Defense of the Interests of Islam and Muslims in France
The RAMF is not the only forum the UOIF uses to defend and discuss the
interests of Islam and Muslims in France, which is the fourth principal activity of the
federation. This might be the most important of activities for the UOIF, especially with
regard to it becoming the most visible Muslim federation in France, as it was in 1989
when the UOIF took its first major stand and gained the recognition of Muslims across
the country—for better or worse. Defending the interests of Muslims is the most visible
action that any of the federations perform, and their success or failure opens them to
positive or negative criticism and thus, an increase or decrease in support and confidence
or skepticism toward the federation. This section will address the way the UOIF defends
the interests of Islam and the Muslims of France by focusing on two major issues: the
45

evolution of Vaffaire dufoulard,

which will lead into an analysis of the riots of 2005

and the Danish newspaper cartoons of 2006, and the emerging threat of islamophobia.
First, the year 1989 marks the beginning of the famous affaire dufoulard. One
day, three girls in Creil were expelled for refusing to remove their headscarves that they
had been wearing to school for years. The UOIF came to the girls’ defense because the
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'‘Foulard’ is one of the French words used to describe the Muslim headscarf. There are many different
types of headscarves and coverings in Muslims communities, but one of the frequently used words in
Arabic is Jiijab.' From this point on, we will use the word ‘headscarf,’ except where directly quoted.
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headscarf was clearly not against the law; it was the federation that spearheaded the
defense/^ It “offered legal counsel to the veiled girls who were expelled from schools in
Creil and paid for some lawsuits to fight expulsion.”"^^ On 27 November 1989,the
Minister of National Education affirmed that “the wearing of religious items is not
incompatible with the principle of laicite, except if it is an act of pressure, provocation.
48

proselytism or propaganda,

The girls also went back to school with their headscarves

ten days later. The UOBF clearly expressed that the headscarf was only a form of religious
responsibility. The UOIF invented the slogan,“No one has the right to force a girl to
»»49

wear a headscarf, but no one has the right to force her to take it off either,

This slogan

refers to the personal decision of a woman to wear the headscarf; the UOIF supports that
a Muslim cannot force another Muslim to wear a headscarf, but also makes it clear that
no outside influence (i.e. the French government) should be able to take that right away.
As was shown by the UOIF’s prominent female leaders, that slogan shows that the UOIF
is supportive of the rights of the individual woman in Islam.
However, in 2003, the question of headscarves in France resurfaced and led to the
creation of the Stasi Commission, which was charged with evaluating the role of the
headscarf in Islam and French society. That commission resulted in the eventual law of
15 March 2004, which banned headscarves in the public sphere—despite being fueled by
the Conseil d’Etafs “reaffirmation that the public display of a religious symbol—
»50

whatever it is—does not break the law.

In the aftermath, Breze encouraged the
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adherents of the UOIF to start a project to educate everyone on what was happening, in
turn calming the spirits and alleviating the worries concerning the law, but the
government moved into legislation halting any progress that might have been made by
such a movement. It is important to the UODF to work toward a compromise concerning
the affaire du foulard so that Muslim women can respect their own convictions and not
experience humiliation and shame, but the federation also thinks that the French
government radicalized its position, and the UOIF “cannot stand on the side of close„51

minded and unjustifiable law.

The passion with which the UOIF challenged the French government concerning
the law banning the wearing of headscarves in France was soon diminished, as the UOIF
did not want to instigate a disregard for the laws and educational institutions of the
Republic, which would show a lack of support for the French state. However, that did not
happen before the UOEF urged girls to test the law in 2004 by going to school “in the
clothes they have decided to wear.” As a result, two French reporters were taken hostage
in Iraq—the demand was that the French repeal the law or the reporters would be
executed—which forced the UOIF’s Friday prayers to denounce the kidnapping. The
UOIF made it clear that they were still against the law, but they did back off from testing
the law.^^ Many alluded to the UOIF’s affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood in the
aftermath, but John R. Bowen, who is one of the leading authorities on headscarves in
France after his extensive study published last year, cannot confirm such an affiliation.
He can only say that the leadership of the UOIF was associated “rightly or wrongly” with
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the Muslim Brotherhood.

On 10 April 2004, Breze spoke at the 21^* RAMF. He spoke

for the Muslims “who had been hurt and humiliated,” but added that “French Islam
[should] show its maturity and wisdom.” He promoted the following of the law and
called on young Muslims to do everything they could to not give up on school, and he
asked that educators do their part in supporting the education of our youth as well.
Nevertheless, at the RAMF,there is still a yearly increase in the stands raising funds for
54

private Muslim schools.

That might seem like a difficult endeavor, but contrary to what

one might assume from the law government, the French state will provide funding for
any schools provided that they teach within the boundaries of the national curriculum.
55

keep any religious courses optional and do so independently for five years.
The stance of the UOEF concerning headscarves went from a position of strong
56

opposition and defense in 1989 to a weaker acceptance in 2004. In the following two
years, there would be two more high profile issues on which the UOIF would be forced to
act and which would suffer the same end. The UOIF was one of the first organized bodies
57
to attempt to calm the rioters in the Parisian banlieues in 2005, but the UOIF’s “Anti-

Riot Fatwa” of 6 November was ignored.^^ The UOIF’s action did not influence the
rioters. Then, in 2006, the UOIF could do no more than condemn the cartoonists of the
Danish newspapers, which published defamatory images of the prophet, Mohammed.
Some of the cartoons were later published by Charlie Hebdo, a satirical newspaper in
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France. The UOIF along with the GMP attempted to sue the publication, but to no avail,
as the courts have “have repeatedly defended free speech rights against religious
.59

objections.’

The UOIF’s low-profile critical posture vis-a-vis the French law banning

the fiijab in state schools in 2004 and the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Muhammed in
2006 has given the impression that the organization’s leadership has succumbed to the
..GO

French authorities.

Unfortunately, the headscarf affair and ensuing responses by the UOIF and other
federations were also the catalyst for the debate concerning Islam’s ability to integrate
into French society. The UOIF realized that the negative sentiment that arose from this
path of questioning was going to make its job much more difficult; the UOIF was going
to have to pursue it goals more carefully and with apparent examples of how its actions
61

are in line with the idea of republicanism.
The UOIF believes in the integration of Muslims into French society, but they are
leery of the assimilationist tendencies of the French Republic, which means that they use
their position with the government not only to aid with the French government’s desire to
serve the Muslim community but also to defend Islam and contest the actions of the
French government that the UOIF finds unfair toward the Muslim community. Though
the UOIF finds many things detrimental to the life of a Muslim in France—unveiling of
women, women being seen by male physicians and islamophobia among them—it still
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advocates that Muslims understand that they have a dual responsibility to both their
62

spiritual Islamic heritage and their civic responsibilities as inhabitants of France.
The UOIF supports the CFCM, which is trying to unify the Muslims of France; it
supports youth education; and it is trying to improve its relations with the political class
in France so as not to remain in a subordinate position—especially with regard to
islamophobia. The UOIF played a vital role in the development and creation of the
Conseilfrangais dii cidte miisidman (CFCM),for which it serves a vice-presidential role
and which it believes was a step in the right direction. The focus now needs to change to
how the CFCM can be made effective.^^ The arrival of Minister of Interior Dominique de
Villepin in 2004 spelled difficult days for the CFCM.In conclusion to the RAMF 2007,
there was a consensus by the Muslim participants that the CFCM was not doing enough
64

for Muslims on a national scale. They feel that it does not act with enough urgency.
Fouad Alaoui, Secretary General of the UOIF,commented on the future of the CFCM,
saying that it depends on two factors: Muslims, who must remain supportive and not get
discouraged, and the French state, which must keep the power of the CFCM in the
interests of the Muslims and national interest. He continued by commenting on the
thought of that perhaps being overly “utopist, but it is the only gauge, in [the UOIF’s]
opinion, of success if [they] do not want to bury the CFCM,like has been the case with
other initiatives before it..>65
However, there is a second major issue that challenges Islam in France and the
UOIF: islamophobia. Muslims in France have continued to live through difficult times as
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the victims of vandalism of cemeteries and fires set to mosques, in addition to the
aforementioned threats to Islam. The European Monitoring Center for Racism and
Xenophobia(EUMC)conducted a survey of the Muslim population in multiple European
countries concerning islamophobia.^^ In France, the EUMC reported that Muslims in
France feel “totally integrated”^^ by their own standards but that Muslims, who have only
known France and French society as home, do not feel that they are French in the eyes of
the French public.

The happenings outside of France—the war in Iraq, terrorists in

Palestine—have also had an adverse effect on Muslims in France increasing
islamophobia, but Muslims do not feel that the way in which the government has acted
70

with regard to those issues is wrong, However, Muslims in France do feel that
government actions such as the law of 15 March 2006, which banned all religious
symbols, has contributed to a mentality of French society to think it acceptable to be
against Islam because Islam was the only religion affected by that law

there are no

„71

Christians who are wearing big crosses.

The fact that Muslims feel that islamophobia is omnipresent in French society and
the concerns of the French government as a contributor makes islamophobia important.
The following chapter will further evaluate the threat of islamophobia with regard to the
entire French Muslim community, but it is important in this chapter to continue with the
importance of the UOBF and the role it plays in addressing islamophobia. The UOIF
thinks that it has always stepped up to present itself as an intermediary and deliver a
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„72

communique, a speech or a condemnation when needed,

In fact, the EUMC report

showed that Muslims expressed optimism in two areas: the younger, more knowledgeable
generation knowing its rights and how to stand up for them^^ and that organizations “such
as the UOIF” represent the Muslims of France and “work in the interests of their
„74

community.”

The UOIF is an encouraging contributor to Islam in France and its relations with
the French. “[The UOIF] speaks French in all its regional dialects, forms associations to
lobby French administrators, and helps raise funds for the construction of prayer spaces
and Muslim private schools, in accordance with the laws on religious associations and in
»15

the spirit of reducing the influence of foreign donors on Islam in France,

The UOIF

encourages its associations and followers to contribute as well. In a speech at the
reception of the RAMF 2006, Breze made references to the famous Muslim scholarship
of ancient Baghdad,“numerous are the Muslims who have already contributed to the
construction of France,„76 He further commented that it takes active citizens; be good
ambassadors of your religion and your culture.”^^ Concerning the French presidential
elections of 2007, the UOIF tried to keep “a relatively neutral position” in all of its
speeches and sessions—the UOIF had no desire to create a voting block—but Breze
78

promoted the need for Muslims to inform themselves and vote as good French citizens.
The UOIF’s constant push for participatory Muslims—seen in the speeches at the
RAMF especially—is part of a battle against islamophobia, which the UOIF feels is a
72
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threat to Islam and the French society. The closing statements of the RAMF in 2007 were
centered on this issue. The UOEF would like to see the issue addressed by the
government, which has yet to happen in a public forum since that address. One of the
speakers at the gathering, Hani Ramadan, director of the Centre Islamique de Geneve,
stressed the importance of frank dialogue with the purpose of reciprocal understanding
and mutual respect as a means by which the government could lead an initiative to
79

alleviate islamophobia.
An often-repeated quote from the same gathering was,“what are we waiting
for?

The closing statements, after demanding help from the French government, turned

back to the responsibility of Muslims and reminded Muslims of three things to do and
three risks of which to be aware. “Muslims must demonstrate an attachment to the nation
and the religion so that they can be at the same time French and Muslim, despite the
islamophobia, discrimination, and extremists”; being a good Muslim and a good citizen
are complementary. Muslims must also remember that they are “Europeans, citizens of
France of a Muslim confession, originating from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Africa and
Asia.” Finally, “the future is in the education of Muslim youth.” The risks were the
81

privatization of Islam,

the nationalization of Islam,^^ and the silence in the face of

islamophobia, which all lead to Islam being lost in the dominant secular society.
A common objection to the UOIF is that its approach to the defense of Islam and
the Muslims of France lies in the accusation of holding a double discourse. Competing
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federations—GMP and FNMF—accuse the UOIF of presenting different theological
solutions to the government and its followers. The president of the UOIF has been
accused, especially in 2004, of being two-sided and too willing to compromise on
multiple occasions. It is apparent in his stances on some controversial issues—Vajfaire
dllfoulard and the French republication of the defamatory cartoons

that his two-

sidedness is not as reported: he was adamantly against the bombings in Madrid, citing the
common verse from the Quran, “killing a human being is like killing the entirety of
humanity.

In his book on the hope of religions in France, Nicolas Sarkozy states that

he does not believe in the accusations of a double discourse practiced by the UOIF. He
further comments that—despite the UOIF’s initial attempts to test the law of 15 March
2004—the UOIF has always held a position “respectful of the Republic...and not the
radical image that we give it.

Community-geared Initiatives
The fifth principal activity is what the UOIF refers to as “community-geared
initiatives.” This includes social and cultural activities with member associations and
institutions for the benefit of specific Muslim groups- women,children, students, the
less fortunate. An important question in Islam is the treatment of women, and the UOIF is
very supportive of women’s rights and abilities to contribute to the community.
Concerning the headscarf, the UOIF will not stray from noting that the headscarf is an
obligation in Islam, but it stresses that it must be undertaken by the woman’s own
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willingness.

The UOIF does not support forced marriages, thinking them an

44

.86

abomination.’

To better address issues that concern women,the UOEF has also had

women serve on the bureau executif dLnd as the director of the RAMF.Fatiha Ajbli was
on the bureau executif oi the UOBF, and she feels that the “UOIF supports woman in
87

achieving any level of prominence in politics and the workplace.

The director of the

22nd RAMF in 2005 was a woman, Latifa Ait Taleb. She still holds a high position in the
88

coordination of RAMF as she was one of two Assistant Directors in 2007.

Children and students are of constant importance in many of the UOIF activities,
but there are specific initiatives led by or supported by the UOIF. Most of these initiatives
happen at the college level. The organizations are not typically funded by the UOIF; the
UOIF prefers to support them in an advisory role, so that groups lead autonomously. In
1989, Fouad Alaoui founded one Muslim student organization, Etudiants Musulmans de
89

France (EMF). The UOIF has also been associated with another one of these
organizations, as its members tend to support the UOIF, Union des Jeunes Musulmans
(UJM).
The relations with the UJM have brought another wave of criticism to the UOIF
because the UJM is “managed by Tariq Ramadan and his brother, Hani, and subsidized
„90

by Saudi donations.

The major issue is the association with Tariq Ramadan who is an

Islamic intellectual well known throughout Europe and especially the francophone world.
He has written some 20 books and over 700 articles. It is rumored that almost two
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91

hundred of his sermons circulate on the internet. Ramadan is, like the UOIF, an “avid
proponent of Muslim citizen engagement, and his public speaking often focuses on the
responsibilities of Muslims in the West to think beyond their own grievances,” and he has
also been accused of double discourse, saying one thing to Muslims in the Middle East
„92

and another to those in France; he has even been labeled the “prince of doublespeak.
However, a “discursive study” by Khadija Mohsen-Finan in 2003 discounted the
93

accusation that Ramadan is inconsistent in his views. The similarities are there, but
Ramadan is a Swiss national, who is also well-known for his attacks of the French
government, blaming them for many of the issues regarding Islam in the West and
demanding that they change their system to accommodate the Muslim community. His
comments are often “aggressive and unappreciated,” but he remains unaffiliated with the
UOIF or any other “federation, although he associates with youth groups that are close to
„94

the UOIF.

The UOIF also has a responsibility to provide support for those who live in less
fortunate circumstances. The UOIF has two humanitarian efforts that are heavily
advertised and promoted at its events- ■each of them was advertised on multiple issues of
the journals for the RAMF from 2005-2007. The Comite de Bienfaisance et de Secours
aux Palestiniens (CBSP) is a group for humanitarian aid in Palestine. Secours Islamique
is a French humanitarian group whose efforts focus on African instability. In the
conclusions of the RAMF 2007, Breze summarized the opinions of the participants
concerning the UOIF’s humanitarian efforts: “Darfur is in crisis and Muslims would like
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to see a collective national effort toward a solution”; “they call for independence and
stability to be reestablished in Iraq”; and “they remain allied with the Palestinian
„95

people.

Interfaith Dialogue
The sixth and final principal activity of the UOIF is interfaith dialogue, which
»96

they support especially with the “religions of the book.

In an interview for the book.

Qu'est-ce qiie VVOIF?, the president of the UOIF tells the story of his own personal
family and of how he takes personal interest in this endeavor; when he was a student, he
was sent to France by his father whose name is Issa (Jesus) and he named his son Moise
(Moses) to continue to promote a form of interfaith dialogue.^^ The UOIF initiates
dialogue among the other religious leaders in France. The UOBF has had Father Michel
Lelong speak twice at the RAMF in the past three years. His speeches revolve around
peace and justice for all humanity.^^ The UOIF also had Marcel Manoel, president of the
Federation reformee protestante de France, at the RAMF in 2006. He emphasized the
importance of not disassociating faith from daily life.^^ In addition, the UOIF participates
in discussions and conferences with the Conseil Representatifdes Institutions Juives de
France (CRIF), which is the Jewish equivalent to the UOIF. Fouad Alaoui participated in
100

a debate in 2004 with the president of CRIF, Roger Cukierman.
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that a lot of the efforts for which they stand can be aided by the institutions of other
religions.

Other Relations and Resources
Outside of the six principal activities outlined by the UOIF,there are two other
topics of importance: the funding for the UOEF and its apparent father organization. The
funding for the budget, in addition to the member associations, comes from private
donors. According to the UOEF,on rare occasions, the donors can be foreign, but never to
101

exceed twenty percent of the annual budget,

That is debatable as there are claims that

the representatives of the UOIF go on regular fundraising trips to the Gulf states and to
Saudi Arabia.

102

The treasurer of the UOIF said that “Gulf state donations composed

only ten percent of the UOIF’s operating budget in 2004, down from twenty-seven
percent in 2001,[and that] the federation maintains a ‘policy of nonintervention’ by its
99

donors in its affairs.

103

The apparent father organization of the UOIF is the Federation of Islamic
Organisations in Europe (FIOE)—apparent because it is unconfirmed how connected the
two organizations actually are. The UOIF is reported as the French branch of this
organization, which is based out of London and has twenty seven other organizations
similar to the UOIF throughout Europe.

However, according to the FIOE’s website, the

UOIF is one of only four organizations,*^^ and the UOIF does seem to share the same
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views as the FIOE, but the reference to the FIOE only that of a “partner,” and there is no
106

internet link to the cite of the FOEE.

The FOIE is not visible in France, and the

association between it and the UOIF does not seem to be very strong in the historical
context of the UOIF either.

Conclusion
Through the analysis of the principal activities and networks of the UOIF and the
historical foundation of the UOIF, it can be concluded that the UOIF has truly
experienced an evolution in appearance and practice. The practices of the UOIF reflect a
true desire to work for the Muslims of France in the context of the French society.
Furthermore, Muslims in France think of the UOIF as an effective representative
institution. However, the threats of islamophobia and the actions of the French state will
have an impact on the future success and presence of the UOBF and institutionalized
Islam. The following chapter will expand the study using a model that will provide a
better understanding of the relationships—the volatility or strength of—concerning
Muslims in France, which will in turn provide prospects for the future of institutionalized
Islam and the ongoing project of Muslims in France becoming members of French
society.
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Limits of Institutionalized Islam:
The “Muslim Field”in France
The last chapter showed the relative prominence of the UOIF and its desires to
work for Muslims in the context of French society. The arena in which the UOIF works
within France is larger than its personal interaction with other actors. This chapter will
focus on expanding the study to analyze the factors affecting Islam in France and
especially the perspective of the French non-Muslim community, which has only briefly
been mentioned to this point in the study. Such an expansion will help confirm the
success of institutionalized Islam and future prospects for the Muslim community in
France or show how institutionalized Islam might otherwise fail.
To expand the study, this chapter will use a framework derived from a study
presented Frank Peter’s “Leading the Community of the Middle Way: A Study of the
Muslim Field in France.” Peter has presented the “French Muslim Field” using the
Bourdieu field concept, which he describes as a model that focuses more on the factors
that permit relationships, rather than focusing on the relationships themselves. Peter
defines the ‘Muslim field’ as a “relational structure of positions [occupied by religious
organizations, the French government, the public] which are defined and in turn
determine the agents occupying them as a part of a broader distribution of capital, i.e.
potential sources of power [in this case, religious authority].”^ He shows that religious
authorities control capital by associating themselves with existing definitions of capital or
Peter 2006: 708.
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by trying to convert the definitions of capital to definitions with which they can
associate." Due to the constant competition for capital, the field is continually changing,
and that allows many actors to claim small portions of authority, but it also makes it
difficult to build a strong position, which is why this study is useful in evaluating
institutionalized Islam with regard to the UOIF and the other stronger actors. This study
will use the teiminology and concepts developed by Peter to examine the way changes in
capital affect Islam and the French Muslim field.
To simplify the study, changes to capital will be divided into the following three
categories: inter-Islamic influences, influence of French policies, and French values.^
Each of the changes discussed will be evaluated as it affects Islamic and French
institutions. It is important to note that it is not possible to obtain all the value of all
capital in the field, especially considering the competition in this field, where “no one
group or type of leader in contemporary Muslim societies possesses a monopoly on the
,4

management of the sacred.’
Finally, this study will delve deeper into one of the ways in which the French
Muslim field is affecting French values. The French Muslim field has caused many
scholars to entertain the possibility of reevaluating the values of the Republic. Jeremy
Jennings, an English political theorist, presents what he thinks are the three distinct
opinions of the French with regard to the values of the Republic. My study will then
evaluate the potential for a change of Republican values. That will prove important, as
^ Peter understands that his study places a heavy importance on the Muslim field in that it does not include
the full influence of transnational links, but he thinks that it is proportional to the importance afforded it,
citing that “the fact that more than 1,200 out of approximately 1,600 mosques and prayer rooms in France
participate today in the CFCM...as an indicator for roughly evaluating the importance of this trend (712).
^ Influences outside of the Muslim Field in France, which can impact the field, are not evaluated in the
study due to the lack of verification of their impact. There is no limit to the extent of external influences.
Dale F. Eickelman. “The Coming Transformation of the Muslim World.” Middle East Review of
Internationa! Affairs. (1999), 80.
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any changes to those Republican values will affect the values of capital in the French
Muslim field.

Muslim Influences
Most Muslim influences come in the form of an actor attempting to increase the
value of its capital and decrease the value of a competing actor’s capital. In their book,
Muslim Politics. Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori comment on the fragmentation
of religious authority and argue that there are two outcomes: “the intensification of
dispute and contest,” where actors continue to compete by increasing the exposure of
their capital and devaluating that of the other, and “the multiple centers of power or
contenders for authority [coming] to various accommodations”(i.e. the sharing of
capital). ^ In most instances, the value of capital increases or decreases with visibility, and
as disputes are more visible, those are the instances where the most change in value of
capital occurs. However, there are some cases where two competing actors will act to
benefit one another where they both see value in doing so or where they feel like their
capital would devalue in not doing so. An example of such coordination is the UOIF and
the GMP with regard to education. Both federations agree with the French government’s
view that there is a “need to educate ‘young’ Muslims and ensure their successful
y-,6

socialization into French society.

In acting together, both federations have gained

capital on the Muslim actors who do not support the same view, but relatively the two
federations have equal capital in supporting the idea.

^ Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori. Muslim Politics. (Princeton University Press, 1996), 131-135.
Peter 2006: 708.
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The same two federations, though both in agreement with the French government
over one issue, compete in the larger field to be closer to the French government, which
further increases or decreases their capital. The GMP,since losing the capital of being the
Ministry of the Interior's confidant among the Muslim federations to the UOIF—as
demonstrated in the previous chapter,—has tried to devalue the UOIF as it is a source of
capital for the ministry. The common way in which the GMP has done this is by trying to
distance the UOIF from French values by bringing the UOIF closerio foreign values.
The GMP often promotes the UOIF’s unverifiable connection with the Muslim
Brotherhood. In turn, the UOIF must work to keep the capital it possesses. The UOIF
tries to limit its communication with Middle Eastern scholars as to not undermine its
intention to promote a French Islam.^
In the French Muslim field, most of the Muslim factors resulting in a change in
the value of capital do not negatively affect the most powerful Muslim institutions. Most
of the changes come in the form of factors that increase the capital of the actor affecting
the change. Most often the capital is gained, and the competition is in limiting how much
another institution gains from a change. There are some factors though, like the riots in
the banlieiies of Paris in 2005 that are caused by (mostly) Muslim actors, that can have a
negative affect on capital. In this particular example, the UOIF saw a chance to increase
its capital by releasing the Anti-Riot Fatwa, but it was ignored and had the opposite
effect. The argument that surfaced was that of the failure of such an influential
organization in France demonstrating the disconnect between its leadership and the
people that the organization claims to represent. ® The UOIF’s capital was challenged

^ Caeiro 2005: 48.
Boukhars 2006: 10.
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until the riots stopped, and then, the UOIF was forced to regain that lost capital through
initiatives that show it represents and has the respect of its community—^in this case the
RAMF fills that role.

French Policies
French policies have affected the capital in the Muslim field in many ways. It was
French policy that gave value to certain actors in the field and built the field’s importance
within the greater French field. A good example of that is when the French government
pushed for the creation of the CFCM.^ The second-generation immigrants of Islamic
background grew up fully immersed in French society, attending French schools,
speaking French and associating with other French citizens. That created a gap between
them and their first-generation parents still trying to hold onto the culture and religious
practices from their home countries. That increasing gap was the result of a breakdown of
parental and religious authority—parental in that the second-generation Muslims were in
conflict with their parents over the life they lived at home and the life they lived in
French society, and religious in that the second-generation Muslims were in conflict with
the Islam taught to them by their parents or imams from their parents’ countries of origins
and the Islam taught to them by imams in France. The breakdown of authority was a
factor in the threat of religious “radicalism,” which Frank Peter argues had a direct effect
on the changes by the French government to go from an assimilation-based immigration
10

policy to a policy that worked harder “to incorporate Islam in its national structures.

’Peter 2006: 713.
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In

so doing, it chose to give more value to institutionalized Islam in the discourse of Islam
in French society.
The French government then made changes to the value of certain approaches to
institutionalized Islam. Initially, the French wanted to keep the policies of integration and
religion separate issues and it only associated itself with the “moderate” or “secular”
Islamic groups (e.g. Grande Mosquee de Pam-GMP)and exclude more “radical” groups
11

(e.g. UOIF).

However, the French government’s main struggle was the integration of

“second-generation” immigrants of Islamic background, which eventually led to a change
in policy; “responding to the weakness of the GMP,the state opted for a more inclusive
policy towards groups such as the UOIF.”^“ That increased the capital of holding stronger
stances with regard to the support of Islam. That was one of the factors that led the GMP
to change its “moderate” or “secular” visions to stronger “Islamic” visions, or otherwise
suffer a major loss of capital.
As a part of the government’s desires to incorporate Islam into the framework of
the French nation, it has “for the last couple of years, given (directly or indirectly)
»13

financial support to an estimated third of all mosques that are being constructed,

One

of the factors that led to this is the abrogation of the clauses of the law of 1901 that
permitted non-citizens to found associations in France. At that point, a common practice
was that of Muslim immigrants founding cultural centers to obtain funding for the
mosque attached to it. The French government gained capital by supporting Islam, and
federations gained capital in helping their associations obtain the funds from the
government.
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Within the desires of the French government, there are certain types of capital that
are valued (e.g. French language, a demonstrated capacity to interact with media and
government, an interfaith capacity).'"* That capital has become a commodity for the
Muslim federations as they continue to compete for the position as the most legitimate
leader of Muslims in France. The arguments against the possibility of Islam becoming
French were countered by the French government’s recognition of the French language as
valuable capital for imams and other authorities in France because it expanded the French
language from just cultural capital to religious capital as well.'^ That shows that capital is
as much defined by what an actor possesses as it is by what another actor thinks is
necessary for others to possess, i.e. if it is valued by another actor it has value.‘The
project of devising a ‘French Islam’ is also one of the factors behind the impetus towards
a greater visibility of Muslim worship, including the building of mosques (but not
minarets which, although legally allowed, are usually socially discouraged) as transparent
» 93

counterpoints to the ‘Islam of the caves.

16

The top three federations have increased the

visibility of French Islam in their endeavors as a result.

Public Perception
Public perception, though possessing some constant features, is one of the most
frequently changing areas within the Muslim field. A simple act that catches the camera
of a reporter or the pen of a journalist can have an instant effect on the entirety of the
public’s perception of Islam and the associated capital. Regardless of the actions

or
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opinions of the French political powers, there are still numerous publications that demand
things like the reform of Islam before it can take a participatory place in the ‘real’
17

world.

The best example is I'ajfaire diifoulardy where one day the school forced those

young girls to take off their headscarves. That was a factor in the opposition of the UOIF
and other federations with the government, which in turn was one of the factors leading
to the law. That instance made the value of being able to defend Muslims against the
unfair Republic very volatile for the federations. Some argue that, “this loss (the law of
15 March 2004, banning the headscarf) by political Islamists, exacerbated by political
under-representation and the disengagement of French Muslims from the institutional
space, has created a dangerous void and an organizational vacuum similar to that of the
1980s when several movements of Muslims strove to provide social organization for
Muslim deprived neighborhoods,

18

That meant that the federations, from that point.

would compete to regain lost capital—the support of Muslims in France.
At the same time, the whole affair played a role in devaluing Islam, as it sparked
the rampant Islamophobia. According to the UOIF,there are three types of
islamophobia.’^ There are the “passive islamophobes,” who are individuals whose
islamophobia is expressed in their identity, “I am not who you are, I am better than who
you are,” and who are thus, individuals. There are “combative islamophobes,” who are
aggressive and violent, and they function through their willingness to do evil to Muslims
(from physical abuse to burning mosques). There are also “intellectual islamophobes,”
who are those to whom Islam poses a huge ideological problem. They will do what that
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can to demonize Islam and Muslims highlighting the incompatibility of Islam and the
Republic, the menace to French identity, fundamentalism, the dominated and defenseless
Muslim woman, the danger of communism brought by Muslims...etc. They will talk
about anything that brings about a suspicious opinion of Islam.^^ All of the types of
islamophobia change the value of capital. From the passive, who changes the value of a
French appearance to individual Muslims; to the combative, whose actions present new
sources of capital; to the intellectual, who looks to gain capital from continuing to
promote islamophobia. Islamophobia is a direct competitor with all Muslim actors in the
field.
Islamophobia has taken capital away from the Muslims politically. For example,
none of the invited presidential candidates for last year’s elections attended \ht Rencontre
anniielle des musulmans de France(RAMF). Attending that meeting is seen as a sort of
liability by the French non-Muslim community—or a loss of capital—and by those
candidates not going, it also takes away from the capital of the UODF and the importance
of Islam in France. Even Nicolas Sarkozy, now president of the Republic, who was the
Minister of the Interior who helped to create the CFCM and has attended the UOIF’s
gathering before, did not attend, showing that islamophobia has gained capital with the
French government as he is distancing himself from an issue in which he once played the
key role.“’ More pressure is now on the Muslim actors, especially the federations to work
for the capital they lost. There are arguments that Islam is generating more trust as the
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federations regain that capital, but the “dominant tendencies [of the French] are [still]
more islamophobic."""
It is important to note the reactionary competition for capital in the Muslim field.
„23

“Since the Middle Ages, the view of Islam as a violent religion is used regularly,

Islam

has been constantly presented as a force of opposition, and the way the French Muslim
Field functions is not particularly effective in changing that image of Islam, whether or
not it also refers to the actions of the French Republic. Most important, with regard to
public perception and situations like the affaire dufoulard, is how the field changed
because that situation symbolized a new interpretation of lai'cite. This affected
institutionalized Islam in that it opened new doors through which to gain capital. Laicite
was not as easily definable as the Muslim actors once thought. There was a creation of
capital in finding a way to construct interpretations of laic and Republican values that are
supportive of Islam. Those actors who interpret laicite in a way that supports Islam gain
capital with the Muslim community and the French government. There was also a
creation of capital in trying to show the problems with those values and attempt to have
them changed. Those actors who challenge the values of the Republic might lose capital
with the government, while at the same time, gain capital with the Muslim community.
As a result, the idea for a need to reevaluate French Republicanism and laicite has been
addressed more and more often, and a change to those values could overhaul the entire
Muslim field should it occur.

22
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Potential Change to Republican Values
The constitution of the French government, more commonly known as The Fifth
Republic in France, still references in the

Declaration ofthe Rights ofMan

and of the Citizen from the year of the French Revolution, 1789. The first article of the
constitution is a rcaffiiTnation of the values from that declaration. It states that “France is
an indivisible, Unque, democratic and social Republic, which assures equality before the
law of all of its citizens without distinction of origin, race or religion. France respects all
of its citizens.” The section will focus on laicite and Republican values with regard to the
challenges they face and evaluate the potential for future changes those values.
As Republicanism and laicite have been challenged in recent years by the
diminishing possibility of reconciling the Republican ideals with recognition of the
culture of the Muslim immigrants, many have questioned whether it is necessary to
reevaluate the foundations of French society. This part of the study will use the research
presented by Jeremy Jenning’s article, “Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism
in Contemporary France,” which divides the French public into three distinct ideologies
with regard to the values of the Republic. In addition to other research, the divisions will
be supplemented by data from the Pew Research Center and the Institutfrangais
d'opinion puhlique (Ifop), the leading statistical research center in France.
The first of Jennings’ three Republican ideologies is a ‘traditionalist’ ideology,
which refuses to recognize any facet of a multicultural society and staunchly supports a
strict adherence to the Republican principles of a purely secular state.^"* The second is a
‘modernizing’ ideology, which believes that there ai*e some issues that might be better
addressed with a light endorsement of cultural pluralism, but still believes in maintaining
24
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the keys to Republicanism."^ The final ideology is that of the ‘multiculturalist,’ which
calls for a pluralist overhaul of Republican values and a recognition of the value of
2(>

minority cultural.

^Traditionalist *
‘Traditionalists' feel that their policy is mistaken for one of assimilation when in
reality it has been one of integration. The idea is to integrate the Muslim populations into
French society as naturalized citizens who can practice their religion and culture freely—
so long as they are in private. In 1988, the Rapport de la Commission de la nationalite
published its findings, which declared that a weakening of institutions that embody
27

universal values is what really poses a threat to the future of France.
In response to the Rapport, the Haut Conseil a Vintegration was formed to advise
the government as to how it might better “integrate” immigrants into society,
incorporating the issues that surfaced with the publishing of the Rapport. The
‘traditionalist’ argues that the secular state must be respected—it allows for the freedom
of religious practice without granting special support for any one of them,integration
should occur on an individual level, immigrants will still be expected to respect and
uphold French law before all else, and equality must not only be administered but felt by
the entire public—integration is not meant to give extra rights to immigrants nor is it
28

meant to make anyone feel as if that is happening.
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The Pew Research Center, in 2006, reported that sixty six percent of the French
think that relations betw een Muslims and westerners are generally bad and forty seven
percent of the French fault the Muslims

nineteen percent fault both Muslims and

westerners. Concerning politics, in 2001, Ifop reported that fifty two percent of French
people are against the existence of Islamic political parties. In 2005, the same group
reported that sixty four percent of French people think that laicite is in jeopardy.
According to that same group, the 2001 survey reports that 74% of French support or are
indifferent to the construction of new mosques, which upholds the right to practice
religion. The Pew Research Center reports that 72% of the French think that there is

no

conflict between a devout Muslim and the French modem society. According to Ifop, in
2005, 100 years after the creation of the law that separates church and state 74% of
French think that they should keep the law as opposed to the 18% that see the need for
change.
Thus, the fundamental issues with multiculturalism, according to the
‘traditionalist’ Republican perspective are that it promotes inequality, places culture
before politics and groups before the individual, which all together make the very essence
of multiculturalism anti-French. Should the “traditionalist” ideology prevail—which
appears to be the case from the statistics—the French Muslim field will remain relatively
unchanged as the cuiTent values in the field will be upheld.

72

^Modernizing'
‘Modernizing' Republicans feel that the core values of Republicanism can be
respected and made more effective by conceding a small amount of pluralism; they see
Republicanism as an ideal around which to formulate their realistic laws and
expectations. The extent to which multiculturalism is accepted by the ‘modernizing’
Republicans lies outside the realm of the political entity present in France, meaning that it
is accepted as “the right of citizens and foreigners to cultivate their particularisms in their
personal as well as social life.

They believe that the existence of a political domain that

is independent of the cultural interests of the citizens must be respected at all times, but
they also believe that the law still comes before all else with regard to the equality of the
30

people.

The ‘modemizing’ Republican sees some problems with Republicanism and
laicite as they exist today that would only take minor adjustments to fix. First, Idicite was
initially focused against the Catholic Church, yet there is no problem with the Catholic
Church today. It might benefit the French state to reevaluate the place for religious faith
in society. Next, laicite is founded in such a strong sense of unity that it is often only
effective when there is recognition of “the excluded.” In this case, the excluded group
would be that of the Muslim immigrant, who through that exclusive sentiment turns his
back on French society and focuses even more on religion. Finally, a strong Republican
conception might be “less than welcoming and generous when faced with an immigrant

2Q
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population not prepared [to abandon a culture and] to submit to the rigors of full
●v'l

assimilation."

A look at the statistical data shows that the French are starting to recognize less
the religious alTiliation of politicians. In the 2001, Ifop survey, though fifty two percent
of the French arc still against the existence of Islamic political parties, that is
substantially lower than the seventy percent from 1994. Also in 1994, fifty five percent of
French were against the election of a Muslim mayor, whereas in 2001, only thirty five
percent were against it.
The ideology of ‘modernizing’ Republicanism seems to strive for an equality of
dignity among all citizens that promotes production and positive dialogue. It still
promotes the rights of the individual over collective rights, and overall, the ideal of
Republicanism is respected and upheld insofar as it does not infringe upon the rights to
non-politically inteipreted expressions of culture and religion. The extent to which the
‘modernizing’ Republicans would make changes is not predictable from this study. Not
having that capacity lessens the accuracy of any predictions to how the ‘modernizing
ideology would affect the Muslim field in France.

^Multicultiiralist ’
‘Multiculturalists,’ who represent a small minority—the Ifop survey of 2005
shows that only 7% of French people wish to scrap the law of 1905—believe that the
ideal of Republicanism is not being followed or upheld and dropped entirely because it
gives a false "aura of universality”;^^ they believe that the current ideal forces
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homogenization. They believe that groups should just be recognized, that the government
should attempt to e\ en go so far as to grant collective rights and give them legal
representation and that the government should be responsible for the ensuing necessity
for an organized method of mediating the dialogue and confrontation between groups so
that the differences do not become means by which people separate but rather by which
they come together. They argue that the idea of “intercultural communication” is at the
forefront of multiculturalism."
‘Multiculturalists’ cite issues such as Vajfaire dufoulard as being avoidable if
they were addressed with a more multicultural attitude.^*^ They point to the fact that
everyone immediately pointed to the action of three school girls as an act of provocation,
rather than asking why they chose to wear the headscarf. The ‘multiculturalists’ view the
wearing of the headscarf as a

desire for integration without assimilation, as an

aspiration to be both French and Muslim.

That example is important to understanding

the change that would occur within the Muslim field should the ‘multiculturalist’
ideology prevail. In the study of the field, that event played a major role in the rise of
institutionalized Islam; such a change to the ideals of the French state might be
considered a victory for the federations, especially the UOIF—as the spearhead of the
protests against the banning of headscarves.
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Conclusion
I'hc ‘iradiiitMialisi* ideology seems to offer the least amount of potential for
change to the cun eni Muslim field. Nevertheless, it would have an impact because a
definitive decision to uphold the ideology would change the value in actors attempting to
devalue Uucitc. The ‘modernizing' ideology would have a direct and substantial impact
on the Muslim field. The biggest immediate factor would be the necessity to remove the
law of 15 March 2004 and permit Muslim students and professionals to go to school and
work expressing their religious symbols. Depending on the laws that would continue to
uphold Republican values, should the ‘modernizing’ ideology prevail, the Muslim
community might demand the reevaluation of those values, but no further prediction can
be made without the specific changes. The last of the ideologies, ‘multiculturalist,’ is
certainly the most unpredictable because it would require the creation of laws yet
unthought-of of. The possibility of reversing the roles within the Muslim field is great
with the ‘multiculturalist’ ideology

the institutions of Islam would gain much capital in

a short period of time. Two things can be concluded from this study. First, the
‘traditionalist’ is unlikely to prevail in any way that would change the Muslim field so
that the capital of Muslim actors decreases, but it is the most likely to prevail with the
current climate in France. Second, in the event of the ‘modernizing’ or ‘multiculturalist’
ideologies prevailing, the capital of Muslim actors would definitely increase within the
current field, but it would also change the type of capital for which the Muslim actors
compete.
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Conclusion
Insiituiionali/.cd Islam grew out of a need for representation by the many different
Muslim communities in France, and its authority was determined by its ability to provide
political, social and cultural services. In addition, the French government recognized the
religious authority in Institutional Islam with the many attempts at trying to create an
“official” representation for the entirety of Islam in France, eventually creating the
ConseilfrcuK^ ais du culte musulnmn (CFCM). The relative youth and inexperience of that
council made it necessary to use the Union des organisations islamiques de France
(UOIF) for a case study of institutionalized Islam as a contributor or obstacle to the
prospects of adapting Muslims’ practices of Islam to the French laic society.
The UOIF has demonstrated an evolution in ideology from its political Islanust
origins to a “French Islam” that respects the laws of the Republic, while contesting the
laws that it thinks negatively affect the rights of Muslims as citizens of France. The UOIF
changed its name to signify that it was no longer working for Muslims m France, but for
the Muslims o/'France. The growing structure of the UOIF and the close relationship it
has with the French government have further legitimized its role as religious authority in
France. Through a study of its actions, opinions and networks, the UOEF’s appearance of
change and promotion of methods that work within the laws of the French Republic is
confirmed in its practices as well.
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IncoipiM iiiing the other actors involved through a study of the Muslim field in
France pro\ ided e\ idence of the impact of the UOEF on the potential reevaluation of
French Republican and luYc values by the French government. The UOIF has contested
the unjust nature of those \ alues—the affaire diifoulard and the resulting debated
intcipretation of laiciii\ w hich led to the law of 15 March 2004,—which feeds the
discussions concerning the reevaluation of those values. Either the values of the Republic
will be upheld, not substantially changing the course of the UOIF in its work towards
promoting an Islam that can be practiced in France, or the values will change,increasing
the importance of institutions like the UOIF as they play a role in recreating the values of
the French Republic.
There are tw o threats that remain regardless of the potential for changing
Republican and hue values: the islamophobic mentality of the public and the
unforeseeable external influence. The cun*ent mentality of the French has included a
growing sense of islamophobia, spurred by the growing sense of islamophobia all over
the world. The external influence (i.e. 11 September and other terrorist activity) of events
on the Muslim field cannot be predicted. The UOIF and institutionalized Islam have
shown progress toward adapting Islam to the French society—or pushing for a change to
French society that makes adapting Islam easier—and the UOIF has also shown that its
claim to religious authority does not appear to be challenged by any of the predicted
outcomes of the debates over French values.
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